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ABSTRACT 
 A mature Special Operations Forces (SOF) capability requires dedicated airpower, 
yet the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) has not responded to the deepening relevance of 
Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM). This study qualitatively 
analyzes eight trends that Canada should address to optimize SOF airpower. The trends are: 
remote piloting; artificial intelligence and machine autonomy; processing, exploitation, and 
dissemination (PED); Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); SOF mobility; 
precision strike; Alternative Service Delivery; and fuel sources. From these trends, this 
study finds ten implications for Canada and like-minded nations: the enduring need for 
human involvement as only human influence achieves long-term success; human-machine 
teaming that fuses human discernment and machine learning; the concept of joint by 
design; the idea of modular by design; Alternative Service Delivery and roll-on/roll-off 
platforms; alternative fuel futures like high-altitude pseudo-satellites and the Airfield 
Surface Assessment and Reconnaissance capability; big data PED, including smart sensors 
and novel analytics; employment considerations for Manned ISR assets; tilt-rotor and the 
future of vertical lift; and the trade-offs between fifth-generation stealth fighters like the 
F-35 and the down-teched OA-X observation-attack aircraft. This study ultimately 
advocates for greater interoperability between CANSOFCOM and the RCAF. Both are 
stronger together. 
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A mature Special Operations Forces (SOF) capability requires dedicated fixed- 
and rotary-wing resources, yet the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) has not responded 
to the deepening operational relevance of Canadian SOF. In its 2014 guiding document, 
Air Force Vectors, the RCAF clusters SOF with Space and Cyber activities, both 
significantly more niche and less mature than Canadian Special Operations Forces 
Command (CANSOFCOM).1 Similarly, recent airpower articles from the Canadian 
Military Journal and the Canadian Global Affairs Institute mention CANSOFCOM in 
passing only.2 With more than ten years of domestic and expeditionary SOF operations in 
support of Canada’s national interest, CANSOFCOM has emerged as a key component of 
the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Nevertheless, CANSOFCOM has also emerged as an 
organization that lacks requisite airpower.  
Current indicators show no likely end to the requirement for SOF. The CAF Chief 
of Force Development characterizes the Future Security Environment (FSE) as one where 
“state and non-state actors alike will seek to combine conventional, irregular and high-
end asymmetric methods concurrently, often simultaneously in the land, sea, air, and 
space environments and the cyber domain to gain advantage in future conflict.”3 
Canadian politicians agree; according to Jason Kenney, former Minister of National 
Defence, there is “strategic consensus around the world about the versatility and 
relevance of special operations forces.”4 For irregular and asymmetric threats, the 
irregular and asymmetric solutions provided by SOF are essential. As U.S. Admiral and 
                                                 
1 Royal Canadian Air Force Director General Air Force Development, Air Force Vectors, A-GA-007-
000/AF-008 (Winnipeg, MB, Canada: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, 2014), 20. 
2 Alan Stephenson, The RCAF and the Role of Airpower: Considering Canada’s Future Contributions 
(Ottawa, ON, Canada: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2016), https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/
cdfai/pages/1085/attachments/original/1467750319/The_RCAF_and_the_Role_Of_Airpower_-
_Al_Stephenson.pdf?1467750319. Also see Martin Shadwick, “A Renaissance for the RCAF?” Canadian 
Military Journal 17, no. 2 (Spring 2017): 60–66. 
3 Canadian Armed Forces Chief of Force Development, The Future Security Environment 2013–2040 
(Winnipeg, MB, Canada: 17 Wing Winnipeg Publishing Office, 2014), 93. 
4 “Re-elected Conservatives Would Expand Canada’s Special Forces, Says Kenney,” Globe and Mail, 
September 28, 2015, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/re-elected-conservatives-would-
expand-canadas-special-forces-says-kenney/article26553429/. 
 2 
then Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Eric Olson stated, 
“most conflicts involving NATO in the future will require broadly capable and skilled 
SOF.”5  
The projected future shows no end to the relevance of SOF, something that the 
RCAF must acknowledge and endorse. SOF has a crucial role to play in promoting and 
addressing this recognition as well. CANSOFCOM must formulate a coherent assessment 
of the future that steers the development, generation, management, employment, and 
sustainment of SOF-specific airpower. The problem, then, and the specific research focus 
of this study is as follows: What future trends in airpower must CANSOFCOM and the 
RCAF consider to optimize Canadian SOF airpower? 
A. EXPANDING THE QUESTION 
While conventional forces are capable of power projection and warfighting of 
significant magnitude as seen in history, CANSOFCOM is especially well poised to 
respond to the irregular and asymmetric threats of the future. To do so effectively, it 
requires support from all elements of the Canadian military, including an increase in joint 
interoperability and capability development between CANSOFCOM and the RCAF. 
Thus, far, dedicated support from RCAF has been limited to light utility helicopters. 
CANSOFCOM’s 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron (SOAS) provides 
“dedicated special operations aviation effects as part of high-readiness Special Operations 
Task Forces for domestic and international operations.”6 At the same time, most 
CANSOFCOM operations require more than precision SOF mobility and must therefore 
look outside of dedicated support, to the CAF, allies, and Alternative Service Delivery, 
for the other core capabilities in the air domain, as shown in Figure 1.  
                                                 
5 Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association, “Report of the Canadian Parliamentary Delegation 
Respecting its Participation at the Visit of the Defence and Security Committee,” January 29, 2010, 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/iiapublications/SmartBook/Documents/81b8bcdb-1d03-4745-b195-5679e546795b/
81b8bcdb-1d03-4745-b195-5679e546795b.pdf. 
6 Canadian Department of National Defence, “427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron,” accessed 
October 2, 2017, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-special-forces/427-soas.page. 
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Figure 1.  RCAF Core Capabilities.7 
Due to the lack of dedicated assets aside from Air Mobility, CANSOFCOM is 
obliged to form ad hoc composite task forces to achieve the other core capabilities, 
which, in most cases, focus primarily on Air Attack and Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR). These task forces are made up of non-dedicated assets from the 
RCAF, other federal government agencies, and publicly contracted civilian companies. 
This ad hoc approach results in degraded operational effects stemming from a lack of 
shared cultural understanding, divergent priorities, and decrease of interoperability, 
among a host of other complications. Clearly, CANSOFCOM and the RCAF can do 
better.  
B. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
In a review of literature regarding this focus area, examination of prior work in 
four broad categories finds additional room for analysis.  
First, there is a significant body of study about the future of warfare in a general 
sense and the future of airpower more specifically. As a guiding document, the CAF 
Director of Force Development published FSE 2040. This document examines current 
and past trends to provide context to CAF long-term Force Development activities and is 
a guide for future planning in procurement and other capability planning.8  
International sources are also noteworthy for the study of future warfare. In 2014, 
the United States Air Force (USAF) published both the Air Force Future Operating 
                                                 
7 Adapted from Royal Canadian Air Force, Royal Canadian Air Force Doctrine, B-GA-400-000/FP-
001 (Winnipeg, MB, Canada: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, 2015), http://www.rcaf-
arc.forces.gc.ca/assets/AIRFORCE_Internet/docs/en/cf-aerospace-warfare-centre/b-ga-400-000-fp-001-
royal-canadian-air-force-doctrine-accessible.pdf. 
8 CAF Chief of Force Development, The Future Security Environment, vii. 
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Concept and the USAF Strategic Master Plan. According to the latter, the USAF intends 
to provide “consistent direction across all Air Force portfolios and brings year-to-year 
coherency to our plans and programs.”9 These documents provide a more detailed, Air 
Force-specific guideline for future concepts and planning. Other nations have similar 
documents, but they are less relevant to Canadian future SOF airpower.10 As a whole, 
this category provides broad ideas to frame general planning without specificity. Further 
analysis is therefore necessary to determine the design of future SOF airpower specific to 
Canada. 
The second broad category of published writing is more explicit about future 
Canadian airpower, albeit without a particular SOF nexus. The RCAF has published three 
guiding documents for future capability development. The first, Air Force Vectors, 
discusses how the RCAF will maintain and strengthen multi-role, combat-capable land, 
sea, air, and special operations forces.11 Vectors acknowledges SOF, yet CANSOFCOM 
is not specifically prioritized or acknowledged requisite to current and future strategic 
utility. This theme continues in two other RCAF capstone documents, the 2013 RCAF 
Future Concepts Directive and the 2009 Projecting Power: Canada’s Air Force 
2035.1213 All of these publications provide specific future capability development for the 
RCAF, but they still miss the mark vis-à-vis SOF. 
Five CAF officers have written about separate and distinct capabilities that are 
relevant to CANSOFCOM. All of these works are theses from the Canadian Forces 
College. Major Steve Gillis wrote a service paper in 2016 that focused on the area of tilt 
rotor technology.14 Gillis developed a coherent justification for the future utility of these 
                                                 
9 U.S. Secretary of the Air Force, USAF Strategic Master Plan (Washington, DC, 2014), 2. 
10 For example, see Australian Chief of Air Force, The Future Air and Space Operating Concept, 
AAP 100-F (Canberra, Australia: Air Force Headquarters, 2007). 
11 Royal Canadian Air Force Director General Air Force Development, Air Force Vectors. 
12 Royal Canadian Air Force, RCAF Future Concepts Directive (Winnipeg, MB, Canada: Canadian 
Forces Aerospace Warfare Center, 2013).  
13 Andrew B. Godefroy, Projecting Power: Canada’s Air Force 2035 (Winnipeg, MB, Canada: 
Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Center, 2009). 
14 Steve Gillis, “Tilt Rotor Technology: RCAF Take Notice” (master’s thesis, Canadian Forces 
College, 2016). 
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platforms, including CANSOFCOM in the general discussion. In detail, he shows that, 
without employment of tilt-rotor platforms, SOF aviation may lack the capacity and 
capability to operate in both domestic and expeditionary contexts.15 Lieutenant-Colonel 
J.C.J.P. Gagnon wrote a similar thesis discussing the domain of Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). 
Gagnon once again develops sound recommendations for the requirements of future 
C4ISR, which is certainly a requirement for SOF, yet this paper is dated.16 Most of the 
defense industry has added the concept of cyber and rebranded the entire area of study as 
C5I. Other papers examine similar themes, including ones on technical costs for 
helicopter fleet procurement, light kinetic strike from ISR platforms, and manned 
airborne ISR in general.17  
While all of these papers are excellent sources of select information, they lack two 
key features. First, they are specific rather than general, thereby stove-piping their 
relevance to Canadian SOF airpower. Next, they often lack a SOF-specific focus. One 
particular RCAF officer bridges this gap. Major Tim Streek wrote a thesis in 2013 that 
addresses future SOF airpower in Canada and makes numerous key recommendations.18 
Nevertheless, Streek fails to address significant emerging technologies, such as autonomy 
and artificial intelligence, which will significantly alter the landscape of both fixed- and 
rotary-wing platforms. This collective body of knowledge is more precise than the first 
two yet fails to apply broad future concepts to specific capability requirements in a 
holistic manner. 
Last, the international SOF community has answered questions specific to their 
own organizations. In one very similar and useful work, Major Eivind Johansen, of the 
                                                 
15 Gillis, 8–9. 
16 J.C.J.P Gagnon, “RCAF C4ISR: At a Turning Point” (master’s thesis, Canadian Forces College, 
2016). 
17 W.C. Reyno, “Less is More: Rethinking the RCAF’s Future Rotary Wing Fleet” (master’s thesis, 
Canadian Forces College, 2016); D.G. Jamont, “ISR Strike: The Evolution of the RCAF’s Sense 
Capability” (master’s thesis, Canadian Forces College, 2016); A.R.W. Jordan, “Manned Persistent 
Surveillance and Strike Capabilities for the RCAF” (master’s thesis, Canadian Forces College, 2016). 
18 Tim Streek, “Air Power Support to Special Operations: A Deliberate Requirement” (master’s thesis, 
Canadian Forces College, 2013). 
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Royal Norwegian Air Force, published a paper discussing how Norway should organize a 
SOF-specific Air Wing. Johansen concluded that, with the key ingredients of “political 
will, a long-term perspective and a selection of dedicated and willing SOF airmen, 
Norway will be capable of building up a creative, innovative and adaptive [Air Wing] in 
order to optimize NORSOF for further success.”19 Likewise, in 2012, the North 
American Treaty Organization (NATO) SOF Headquarters (NSHQ) sponsored a Naval 
Postgraduate School capstone project to answer this same question for NATO SOF. 
Although the program did not come to fruition, the analysis in the publication provides 
justification for a SOF Air Warfare Center.20 These two publications are specific for their 
parent organizations and are useful benchmarks for a subsequent study of Canadian 
Future SOF airpower. 
Despite all of these prior publications addressing SOF airpower, a gap persists. 
The flagship documents from Canada and the USAF provide a guide for the future 
operating environment, while the RCAF has its future strategic plans documented. 
Previous research delved into particular capabilities in depth, and allied nations and 
organizations have proposed particular solutions to particular needs. What is lacking for 
Canada is a body of analysis that incorporates significant future trends in airpower to 
determine Canadian SOF airpower for years to come. 
C. SCOPE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study analyzes broad trends in airpower as they relate to CANSOFCOM and 
the RCAF. It clarifies the need for SOF airpower in a qualitative manner. To build the 
research question into valid claims, it begins with significant background and basis for 
SOF. The inclusion of future trends in airpower technology and information processing 
follows, but simply to the degree necessary to provide practical and realistic applications 
for CANSOFCOM. As a result, the technology and information processing sections 
                                                 
19 Eivind Johansen, “How to Organize a Norwegian Special Operation Air Wing” (master’s thesis, Air 
University, 2014). 
20 Arthus D. Davis, ed., The NATO Special Operations Headquarters Air Warfare Center: A Smart 
Defense Approach (Monterey, CA: Presidio Press, 2012). 
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remain outside of a purely technical realm. Ultimately, this study presents implications 
for CANSOFCOM in order to advocate for optimized future SOF airpower. 
Following the introduction, Chapter II comprises a brief history of Special 
Operations in Canada, the current CANSOFCOM force structure, missions, and 
employment concepts. The source material for this chapter is primarily unclassified prior 
work published in Canada, most of which is available on the Internet. The author’s 
personal knowledge and experience augment this chapter along with interviews with 
current CANSOFCOM personnel. Chapter II ends with justification for the future 
prominence of SOF. 
Chapter III assesses SOF in a global context, relating CANSOFCOM to near-peer 
and like-minded nations as members of the global SOF network. The scope of this 
analysis is limited to the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia for specific 
reasons explained in detail in the chapter itself. Chapter III is based on a review of open 
source documentation from these three countries along with personal interviews 
conducted by the author. 
Chapter IV analyzes and validates SOF airpower, based on conclusions drawn by 
the author. It describes the cultural and theoretical development of airpower throughout 
history. It then reviews three examples of failure caused by sub-optimal fixed- and rotary-
wing assets. Although Canada has not yet suffered the same failures as other nations, it 
should still learn from their mistakes. This chapter provides historical examples of 
failures from which CANSOFCOM and the RCAF may learn and opt not to replicate.  
With a strong argument established for future CANSOFCOM airpower, this study 
turns to the eight future trends that will shape its composition. 
 
1. Remote Piloting. A mixture of traditionally piloted and Remotely Piloted 
Aircraft (RPA) will achieve all future effects in the air domain. The use of 
these systems is certain, to the point where a better question is whether 
manned assets will continue to fly in their current numbers.  
2. Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy. The world of artificial intelligence 
(AI) and autonomy is burgeoning as it relates to airpower. Humans may not 
remain intimately connected to future platforms, and will recede further and 
further as technology advances. 
 8 
3. Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination of Data. The sheer depth and 
breadth of data requiring processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) is 
a daunting challenge for any military element now and into the future. 
CANSOFCOM must turn data into decisions. 
4. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. These first three trends 
directly influence future ISR platforms. These platforms are increasingly 
capable, omnipresent, and unbounded by altitude, range, or payload.  
5. SOF Mobility. Future mobility may trend in two separate directions, toward 
compound helicopters, personified in the Sikorsky SB-1 Defiant, or the tilt-
rotor class of aircraft platforms, most notably the Bell V280 Valor. Regardless 
of the path, it appears evident that the payload and range differences between 
helicopters and fixed-wing assets will continue to coalesce in the tactical 
realm.  
6. Precision Strike. The future of fixed-wing strike platforms also has a 
looming divide between highly complex, expensive, and scarce fifth- and 
sixth-generation stealth fighters, and simple, down-teched observation-attack 
platforms in the U.S. OA-X program. Benefits and tradeoffs exist between 
high-end and low-end assets, and an optimized air force possesses a mix of 
both. 
7. Alternative Service Delivery. Resources employed in or supporting the air 
domain may increasingly use contractor owned and operated platforms 
involving civilian companies instead of traditional military units through the 
mechanism of Alternative Service Delivery (ASD). Current examples, in 
Canada as well as abroad, show that air support from non-traditional sources 
is a viable option in the Canadian context.  
8. Fuel Sources. Fuel sources will continue to develop and enable greater range 
and payload capacity across the spectrum of platforms in the air domain. 
However, the goal of perpetual fuel is likely unreachable in the near-to-
medium term. 
These eight trends will affect the CAF well into the next several decades and beyond. The 
significant and valuable implications for CANSOFCOM and the RCAF can guide 
capability and technology development. 
Chapter VI of this study focuses on the implications of these trends for 
CANSOFCOM. The intent of this chapter is to synthesize and contextualize all previous 
chapters into ten relevant, practical, and reasonable propositions upon which 
CANSOFCOM should base its future airpower.  
1. The Enduring Need for Human Involvement 
2. Human-Machine Teaming 
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3. Joint by Design 
4. Modular by Design 
5. Alternative Service Delivery 
6. Fuel Sources 
7. Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination 
8. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
9. SOF Mobility 
10. Precision Strike 
The seventh and final chapter summarizes the trends and implications for 
CANSOFCOM, the RCAF, and the CAF. It proposes a number of other areas for further 
research, and concludes with final thoughts on the importance of optimized SOF 
airpower in Canada. 
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II. CANSOFCOM PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
SOF are an important component of the military dimension to Western 
states’ instruments of national power, today and into the foreseeable 
future. 
—Colonel Mike Rouleau, 
CANSOFCOM21 
 
The previous chapter has introduced and expanded on the question of future SOF 
airpower. Chapter II now provides a backdrop for SOF in Canada. First, it explores the 
history of SOF in Canada. It then describes the current missions and capabilities of 
CANSOFCOM. Finally, this chapter analyzes the future relevance of SOF from both a 
Canadian and a global perspective. 
A. HISTORY OF SOF IN CANADA 
Canada has a long and storied connection with SOF dating back to before 
Confederation. The Seven Years’ War saw irregular raids involving both colonial and 
aboriginal fighters on both sides.22 These irregular troops began a long history of 
disproportionate effects garnered by Canadian SOF units. Then, during the Second World 
War, Canadian involvement in the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the 
combined U.S.-Canadian First Special Service Force (FSSF) gained merit. In the SOE, 
hundreds of personnel were involved in training and support at Camp X in Oshawa, 
Ontario, and 227 Canadian operators deployed into Europe and Asia, often behind enemy 
lines and in direct support of Allied operations.23  
                                                 
21 Colonel Rouleau attained the rank of Major-General and commanded CANSOFCOM between 2014 
and 2018. Colonel Mike Rouleau, Between Faith and Reality: A Pragmatic Sociological Examination of 
Canadian Special Operations Forces Command’s Future Prospects (Kingston, ON, Canada: Canadian 
Defence Academy Press, 2012), 9. 
22 Bernd Horn, “We Will Find a Way”: Understanding the Legacy of Canadian Special Operations 
Forces (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: JSOU Press, 2012), 1. 
23 Bernd Horn, “The Canadian Special Operations Forces’ Legacy,” in Special Operations Forces: A 
National Capability, ed. Emily Spencer (Kingston, ON, Canada: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2011), 
11. 
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Unlike the clandestine SOE, the FSSF gained significant notoriety and were 
nicknamed the Black Devils by the Germans they targeted. In a single year of the war, the 
FSSF killed 25 and captured 235 enemy soldiers for every corresponding FSSF 
commando lost.24 The FSSF experience was not, however, without its failures. Historian 
Sean Maloney has written that friction with the British Royal Air Force (RAF) resulted in 
sub-optimal employment of the FSSF. In perhaps an interesting foreshadowing, he notes 
that “RAF Bomber Command viewed the existence and use of such a force as being 
contrary to its own interests.”25 Nevertheless, the FSSF found a way to achieve 
disproportionate effects. The storied legacy of the FSSF lives on with CANSOFCOM 
today, and CANSOFCOM Operators often wear the FSSF patch indicating that lineage. 
Modern Canadian SOF took shape in the mid-1990s. Until that time, the overall 
Canadian SOF experience was sorely lacking, as Maloney summarizes: “until the 
formation of JTF 2 [Joint Task Force 2] in the 1990s, it was ad hoc, reactive, and 
sporadic in its execution.”26 Beginning in 1992, the Canadian Department of National 
Defence assumed the national counterterrorism role from the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police. This saw the creation of JTF 2 and its pairing with the CH-135 Twin Huey light 
utility helicopters of the RCAF’s 450 Tactical Helicopter Squadron. 450 Squadron was 
eventually replaced by 427 SOAS and the CH-146 Griffon superseded the CH-135. JTF 2 
saw slow but continual growth in size, capability, and reputation until the powder keg of 
September 11, 2001. With that watershed moment, Canada and other like-minded nations 
identified a greater need for SOF. JTF 2 saw involvement in Afghanistan on a continuous 
basis between 2001 and 2011. In doing so admirably, it established itself as a top tier 
SOF Unit. In 2012, then Colonel and not yet commander of CANSOFCOM Mike 
Rouleau wrote that “although a very secretive force, JTF 2 was becoming firmly 
established as a premier Western SOF unit alongside other Western Special Mission 
                                                 
24 John Nadler, A Perfect Hell: The True Story of the Black Devils, the Forefathers of the Special 
Forces (New York, NY: Ballantine, 2006), 2. 
25 Sean M. Maloney, “Who Has Seen the Wind? An Historical Overview of Canadian Special 
Operations,” Canadian Military Journal 5, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 43. 
26 Maloney, 47. 
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Units.”27 427 SOAS saw equal growth in employment and reputation in Afghanistan, 
eventually joining JTF 2: 
The Squadron was eventually forced into a paradigm shift that saw it 
innovating and adapting to develop a significant expeditionary lift 
capability. By 2010 and continuing throughout the end of Canadian 
combat operations in Afghanistan, 427 SOAS aircrew flew full-spectrum 
combat operations on MI-17 V5 HIP helicopters in direct support of the 
CANSOFCOM SOTF in theatre.28 
This growth, however, was temporary. Upon the drawdown of Canadian involvement in 
Afghanistan, 427 SOAS returned to sole employment of the light-utility CH-146 Griffon.  
Along with JTF 2 and 427 SOAS, Canadian SOF grew with two other manoeuver 
units and a Strategic Headquarters equal in influence to the other services. Today, it 
comprises those elements as well as a SOF Training Center, as depicted in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2.  2018 Structure of CANSOFCOM29 
Different from other Level-1 elements in the CAF architecture, CANSOFCOM today acts 
as both a Force Generator—similar to the other CAF services—and as a Force 
Employer—similar to the Canadian Joint Operations Command. Disproportionately small 
                                                 
27 Rouleau, Between Faith and Reality, 12. 
28 Bernd Horn, Shadow Warriors: The Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (Toronto, ON, 
Canada: Dundurn, 2016), 40. 
29 Adapted from Major-General Mike Rouleau, “The Power of Restraint: Leading CANSOF Towards 
2025” (presentation, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA, November 1, 2016).  
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in both stature and funding compared to these others, today, CANSOFCOM is in an 
unprecedented position of strength as an institution and is firmly established as a high 
reliability organization.30 
B. CURRENT SOF MISSIONS AND CAPABILITIES 
The mission of CANSOFCOM is to “provide the Government of Canada with 
agile, high-readiness Special Operations Forces capable of conducting special operations 
across the spectrum of conflict at home and abroad.”31 Although closely aligned with 
U.S. SOF counterparts and often employed alongside allied nations abroad, 
CANSOFCOM has an additional remit for domestic crisis response in support of the 
Canadian Minister of Public Safety. These roles, both domestic and expeditionary, allow 
CANSOFCOM to meet the Government of Canada’s 2017 Defence Policy Review vision 
of employment “in situations that pose an imminent threat to national interests, where the 
use of larger military forces is inappropriate or undesirable, in operational environments 
where access is limited, and against high-value targets.”32 Each CANSOFCOM unit has 
a specific mission, as listed in Table 1. 
  
                                                 
30 HROs manage to avoid mishaps in environments where they are expected or likely due to risk. The 
CANSOFCOM Commander defined CANSOFCOM as a HRO in 2016. Rouleau, “The Power of 
Restraint.” 
31 Canadian Department of National Defence, “Canadian Special Operations Forces Command,” 
accessed October 2, 2017, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-org-structure/canadian-special-operations-
forces-command.page. 
32 Canadian Minister of National Defence, Strong Secure Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy 
(Ottawa, ON, Canada: Department of National Defence, 2017), 40. 
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Table 1.  2018 CANSOFCOM Units and Missions.33 
Unit Mission 
Joint Task Force Two 
(JTF 2) 
Protect the Canadian National Interest and combats terrorism at home and 
abroad. 
Canadian Joint Incident 
Response Unit  
(CJIRU) 
Provide specialized, timely and agile Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 
and Nuclear Defence (CBRN) response to the Government of Canada. 
Canadian Special Operations 
Regiment  
(CSOR) 
Provide high readiness SOF capable of force generating for, and conducting, 
integrated Special Operations Task Forces to execute operations on behalf of 
the Government of Canada. 
427 Special Operations 
Aviation Regiment  
(427 SOAS) 
Provide dedicated special operations aviation effects as part of high-
readiness Special Operations Task Forces for domestic and international 
operations. 
Canadian Special Operations 
Training Center (CSOTC) 
Provide CANSOFCOM with common SOF-specific training, designing and 
delivering a wide range of academic and practically orientated courses. 
 
Beyond these mission statements, a great deal of what CANSOFCOM units are 
capable of achieving remains in the classified realm. Information in the public domain 
makes it clear that they are expected to operate in all environmental conditions, around 
the globe and with a multitude of partners in both the global SOF network and the 
government of Canada’s security and intelligence community. 
C. FUTURE RELEVANCE OF SOF 
Given the contemporary and widely anticipated future dominance of 
irregular over regular warfare, it is not surprising that SOF around the 
world appear to be entering a golden era. 
—Colin S. Gray,  
Another Bloody Century34 
 
The future relevance of SOF in general, and CANSOFCOM in particular, is based 
on three general focus areas: First, the characteristics of the FSE; second, the 
disproportionate effects of SOF; and third, SOF and conventional force synergy. 
                                                 
33 Adapted from various pages subordinate to Canadian Department of National Defence, “Special 
Operations Forces,” accessed November 16, 2017, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-special-forces/
index.page. 
34 Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London, UK: Orion Books, 2006), 215. 
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1. Characteristics of the Future Security Environment 
The primordial driver of change, technology, will advance in unexpected 
ways and rates, but the nature of human interaction, punctuated by war, 
will remain the same. 
Future Operating Environment Handbook, 
CANSOFCOM35 
To begin, the characteristics of the FSE call for a continuation and, arguably, an 
increase in the asymmetric solutions provided by SOF. Disorder and competition within 
and between states and non-state actors is expected to continue at pace. New powers will 
pursue influence at the regional level, often via proxy warfare. Similarly, the decline of 
the nation state in a classic sense will see individuals and groups search for identity and 
culture. The U.S. Joint Operating Environment 2035 summarizes these characteristics 
into two overarching challenges, Contested Norms and Persistent Disorder: 
Contested norms will feature adversaries that credibly challenge the rules 
and agreements that define the international order. Persistent disorder will 
involve certain adversaries exploiting the inability of societies to provide 
functioning, stable, and legitimate governance. Confrontations involving 
contested norms and persistent disorder are likely to be violent, but also 
include a degree of competition with a military dimension short of 
traditional armed conflict.36 
Government of Canada policy documents echo this perspective. Both FSE 2040 and the 
2017 Defence Policy Review discuss the imbalance between adversaries and the 
continuation of small, disorderly wars.37 Whether we refer to the FSE as a competitive 
world order, a multi-polar era, or as just simply disorderly, the trends seem clear. 
Many other military officers, historians, and educators agree. Recently, retired 
USAF pilot Michael Buck wrote that “counterinsurgency and irregular warfare operations 
                                                 
35 CANSOFCOM, Future Operating Environment Handbook (Ottawa, ON, Canada: Department of 
National Defence, 2017), 11. 
36 Director Joint Force Development, Joint Operating Environment 2035 (Washington, DC: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2016), ii.  
37 For FSE 2040, see Chapter I. For the latter, see Canadian Minister of National Defence, Strong 
Secure Engaged, 49–57. 
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in low threat environments will persist for the foreseeable future.”38 This reality does not 
presume that future inter-state conflict has disappeared. Indeed, the U.S. 2018 National 
Defense Strategy indicates that “States are the principal actors on the global stage, but 
non-state actors also threaten the security environment with increasingly sophisticated 
capabilities.”39 This strategy later refers to the “changing character of war,” which is 
echoed in the Government of Canada’s 2017 Defence Policy Review.40 Professor John 
Arquilla’s paradox, which furthers this opinion, is adapted and presented in Table 2. 
Table 2.  Arquilla’s Paradox: Which Wars Really Are Irregular?41 
Since September 11, 2001: 
Number of irregular wars 40 
Number of violent Jihadi groups 50 
Number of U.S. government organizations focused on 
Intel and Counterterrorism 
1,271 
Number of successful bombing campaigns 0* 
*If there was a win, it was Kosovo, but it was an “ugly win.”42 
 
This paradox brings several observations to light. First, it confirms that irregular 
war and terrorist threats are significant and growing. Indeed, Arquilla wonders whether 
perhaps we have inverted the terminology, since irregular warfare has become a 
regularity over the last 17 years. Next, it offers an opportunity to counter-argue the 
ascendance and employment of SOF. With the statistics showing no end to simmering 
conflicts in spite of the ascendance of both SOF and counterterrorism and intelligence 
                                                 
38 Michael Buck, “Full Spectrum Close Air Support for the 21st Century: Leveraging Air Operations 
with Ground Forces,” Mitchell Institute Policy Papers 8 (October 2017): 1. 
39 U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the 
United States of America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 3, https://www.defense.gov/
Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
40 U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, 3. 
41 Adapted from John Arquilla, “The Rise of Airpower” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, August 8, 2017). For a list of U.S. government organizations, see Dana Priest and William 
M. Arkin, “A Hidden World, Growing beyond Control,” Washington Post, accessed November 26, 2017, 
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/7.  
42 Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2000). 
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organizations, perhaps SOF are less effective than currently thought. If the world 
situation is worsening, or at least is remaining persistently disorderly and contested, has 
the employment of SOF been effective? One American general officer wondered the 
same: “as impressive as the targeting process is, an incredible, agile and effective engine 
for dismantling and destroying terrorist organizations, how is it we can’t succeed?”43 
Introspection is certainly valuable on occasion. Nevertheless, the simple reality is that 
since 2001, SOF has been the force of choice and, arguably, the best possible force 
available due to declining military budgets and continued high operational tempo for 
conventional forces.44  
A final thought regarding Arquilla’s paradox is about the efficacy of bombing 
campaigns. His view clearly supports a more comprehensive approach to military 
engagement. Yet airpower advocates believe otherwise. One claim supporting this 
perspective is that airpower may have decisively won the First Gulf War. Early effects 
from the air campaign undoubtedly achieved strategic advantage by reducing the Iraqi 
Air Force, command and control structure, and logistics backbone to ineffectual levels.45 
This author contends, however, that air campaigns achieve very little on their own. 
Inevitably and enduringly, military action requires the deployment of boots on the 
ground, in various scope and scale, to achieve long-term effects. As renowned military 
analyst Fred Kagan has said, “When it comes to reorganizing or building political, 
economic, and social institutions, there is no substitute for human beings in large 
numbers.”46 Moreover, if we need to pick one winning factor from the First Gulf War, it 
                                                 
43 American Lieutenant General, quoted in Bernd Horn, “Over-Rated or Under-Appreciated: 
Measuring SOF Success” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, November 8, 2017).  
44 For example, see Ewen MacAskill, “Ministry of Defence Braced for ‘Brutal’ Cuts in Security 
Review,” The Guardian, November 24, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/nov/24/
ministry-of-defence-in-line-for-steep-cuts-in-2018. For a less balanced perspective, see Thomas Spoehr and 
Rachel Zissimos, Preventing a Defense Crisis: The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act Must Begin to 
Restore U.S. Military Strength (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2017), 
http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/preventing-defense-crisis-the-2018-national-defense-authorization-
act-must-begin. 
45 James A. Winnefeld, Preston Niblack and Dana J. Johnson, A League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in 
the Gulf War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/
MR343.html. 
46 Quoted in P.W. Singer, [Wired for War]: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First 
Century (New York: Penguin, 2009), 215. 
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is not the air campaign—it is information: “information is as important as firepower in 
modern war, as we learned in the Persian Gulf.”47 Bombing does not win wars, 
particularly ones that are irregular.  
In summary, Canada and its allies expect to remain in a protracted long-slow-
indirect series of small wars against non-state actors hedged often by state entities. This 
conflict environment requires joint, combined, and interagency solutions. It requires 
airpower that directly supports ground forces in general and CANSOFCOM in particular. 
It has done so on an increasing basis since 2001. 
2. Disproportionate Effects 
As part of the analysis of SOF relevance, one must also consider the 
disproportionate effects SOF have in relation to their size and cost. SOF units are 
typically small in size and significantly less resourced than their conventional 
counterparts. For example, the increase of 605 CANSOFCOM personnel included in the 
2017 Defence Policy Review represents only 0.8 percent of the CAF, which is miniscule 
in number yet will have disproportionate effects.48 Historian Jamie Hammond has 
observed that “SOF create military, diplomatic and political successes out of all 
proportion to their numbers. They are cost-effective. They operate across the spectrum of 
conflict, understand the requirements of other government departments and are 
comfortable with tactical, operational and strategic goals.”49  
Canadian Brigadier-General and SOF officer Steve Boivin has a similar 
perspective. According to Brigadier-General Boivin, CANSOFCOM brings valuable 
flexibility to the range of military capabilities available to the government of Canada, 
combining adaptable military profiles, very high readiness, and ability to deliver on 
intent.50 The relatively cheap, disproportionate, and popular employment of SOF has 
                                                 
47 Peter Grier, “The Data Weapon,” Government Executive 24, no. 6 (June 1992): 20. 
48 Using data from Canadian Minister of National Defence, Strong Secure Engaged, 13. 
49 Jamie Hammond, “Special Operations Forces: Relevant, Ready and Precise,” Canadian Military 
Journal 5 no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 26. 
50 Brigadier-General Steve Boivin, personal communication, April 20, 2018. 
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military and political value. CANSOFCOM, however, can only achieve this value when 
adequately enabled with a full complement of assets, airpower included. 
3. SOF and Conventional Force Synergy 
At the same time, one should not see the increased relevance of SOF in general, 
and CANSOFCOM in particular, as a replacement for conventional deterrence. Nothing 
in the FSE discounts the significant deterrent effect provided by a large conventional 
military force. Professor Colin S. Gray agrees: “there will be much terrorism and 
insurgency to blight the future, especially the near-term future. But the mischief 
promoted by irregular conflict pales into near insignificance when compared with the 
potential for harm that resides in great power antagonism.”51 Notwithstanding the 
continued need for conventional deterrence, SOF are highly useful elements of national 
power. Part of the basis for this perspective is the effective synergy between SOF and 
conventional forces. One of the five “SOF Truths” is that most special operations require 
non-SOF assistance.52 SOF need support from the rest of the military services (Army, 
Navy, and Air Force) and, indeed, other departments of the government as well. The 
concurrent employment of SOF and conventional forces is a synergistic relationship. 
While SOF need conventional help, the inverse is also true. Historian Mark Moyer points 
out that “in the event of a conventional conflict, large numbers of special operations 
forces could be needed to help organize resistance movements, conduct strategic 
reconnaissance, guide bombs, serve as combat advisers to allied forces, or raid targets in 
the enemy’s rear.”53 CANSOFCOM and the other CAF services concurrently provide 
asymmetric solutions and conventional deterrence, each one complementary and vital. 
                                                 
51 Gray, Another Bloody Century, 383. 
52 The Five SOF Truths are generally attributed to John Collins, a retired U.S. Army Colonel. They 
are: humans are more important than hardware, quality is better than quantity, SOF cannot be mass-
produced, competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur, and most special operations require 
non-SOF assistance. For more, see “SOF Truths,” United States Army Special Operations Command, 
accessed May 6, 2018, http://www.soc.mil/USASOCHQ/SOFTruths.html. 
53 Mark Moyer, Oppose Any Foe: The Rise of America’s Special Operations Forces (New York, NY: 
Basic Books, 2017), 333. 
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D. SUMMARY 
This chapter has described the strong tradition of Canadian SOF since prior to 
Confederation. It then outlined the current state of CANSOFCOM. Chapter II closed with 
a portrayal of the future relevance of CANSOFCOM based on the FSE, SOF’s 
disproportionate effects, and the synergy between CANSOFCOM and the other elements 
of the Canadian Armed Forces. With a firm understanding of SOF from a Canadian 
context, this study now explores SOF in a global context.   
 22 
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III. SOF IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 
Thus, far, this study has revealed a future environment that calls for a 
continuation, and perhaps even growth, of SOF capacity and capability. The lack of SOF 
airpower, as the problem is defined to this point, has remained focused primarily on 
Canada. What are our peer and like-minded nations doing in the realm of SOF airpower? 
This chapter seeks to answer this question. It focuses on the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia, and concludes that CANSOFCOM and the RCAF must emulate 
the good qualities of our peers, while avoiding their past mistakes, in order to build the 
SOF airpower that Canada needs. 
A. SCOPE 
Canada is a sovereign nation and must chart its path in the world based on its own 
particular needs. Nevertheless, it has many other partners and allies in the world with 
whom to compare itself and learn. First, of course, is its neighbor to the south. This 
comparison is fraught with issues of both scale and perspective on global roles. 
Notwithstanding these complications, examination of the U.S. SOF experience provides a 
valuable comparison, and aspirations, for CANSOFCOM and the RCAF. Examined next 
are our closest military allies, the so-called Five Eyes partners.54 The United States, the 
United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand all closely collaborate on defense issues. 
In particular, the United Kingdom and Australia provide useful comparisons as they are 
significantly more analogous to Canada’s military compared to the other two members. 
Canada collaborates with others, for example the NATO Alliance members, who are like-
minded and possess similarly sized militaries. The complexities of the European Union 
and regional issues—migrant peoples, considerable domestic terrorism, and a resurgent 
Russia—mean that priorities and future paths are less relevant than the United States and 
                                                 
54 The name Five Eyes, shortened to FVEY, refers to the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, and New Zealand, which all participate in an intelligence-sharing agreement. For more, see 
James Cox, “Canada and the Five Eyes Intelligence Community,” Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs 
Institute, December 2012, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.357.5576&rep=rep1&type=pdf.  
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the Five Eyes partners. For these reasons, the scope of analysis for the Global SOF 
Network is limited to the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia.  
B. THE UNITED STATES 
Our future tasks are unchanged: find stuff, move stuff, kill things. All on 
behalf of the ground commander. 
—Major General William Gayler, 
U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence55 
 
USSOCOM is the premier global SOF leader based on sheer size mixed with 
significantly advanced capabilities. As of May 2017, the United States boasts 56,000 
active duty SOF personnel with approximately 8,000 of these forward deployed in more 
than 80 countries.56 The airpower component of USSOCOM is significant, with two 
entire commands dedicated to the air domain. Figure 3 highlights the air components of 
USSOCOM. 
 
Figure 3.  2018 Simplified Structure of USSOCOM.57 
                                                 
55 William Gayler, “Aviation Branch Chief Presentation” (presentation, 2017 Army Aviation Mission 
Solutions Summit, Nashville, TN, April 27, 2017).   
56 Posture Statement before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(statement of General Raymond A. Thomas, III, U.S. Army, Commander United States Special Operations 
Command). 
57 Adapted from USSOCOM Office of Communication, Fact Book 2018 (MacDill AFB, FL: 
USSOCOM Communication Office, 2018). 
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Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), at the farthest left of the 
figure, is comprised of 19,500 personnel flying a fleet of manned and remotely piloted, 
specially modified aircraft.58 The mission and tasks of AFSOC are listed in Table 3. 
Table 3.  AFSOC Mission and Tasks.59 
Mission 
Provide our Nation’s specialized airpower 
capability across the spectrum of conflict. Any 
place, anytime, anywhere. 
Essential Tasks 
Long-range infiltration and exfiltration  
Precision strike 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
Enhancing Tasks 
Aerial refueling 
Military information support operations 
Foreign internal defense 




While undetected in combat and hostile 
environments: 
Air traffic control 
Fire support 
Command and control 
Direct action 
Counter-terrorism 
Foreign internal defense 
Humanitarian assistance 
Special reconnaissance  
Para-rescue 




While in hostile or denied territory: 
Environmental data assessment 
Environmental special reconnaissance 
Forecast operational impacts 
Tactical Air Control 
Support ground manoeuver units 
Joint terminal attack control 
Special Operations 
Surgical Teams 
Lightweight, mobile, and rapidly deployable 
casualty evacuation and advanced trauma life 
support aboard USASOC and/or other 
opportune air, land or sea platforms 
                                                 
58 USSOCOM Office of Communication, 26.  
59 Adapted in its entirety from USSOCOM Office of Communication, 29.  
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Table 3 reveals the impressive scope of AFSOC. U.S. SOF in the air domain is 
even more impressive when additional aviation assets outside of AFSOC are considered. 
The U.S. Army possesses the U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command 
(USASOAC). As the only unclassified SOF air component outside of AFSOC, 
USASOAC and its subordinate 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)  
(SOAR (A)) are well known inside the SOF community and publicly renowned for 
involvement in many storied missions. As of April 2017, USASOAC was comprised of 
3,750 personnel and 221 aircraft.60 It is grouped outside of AFSOC and under the U.S. 
Army based on historical precedent, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter IV. 
USASOAC’s organizational and cultural alignment with its major client—U.S. Army 
SOF—assists in remaining relevant. General James McConville, Vice Chief of Staff of 
the U.S. Army, speaking at the Army Aviation Association of America conference in 
2017, stated that “Army Aviation exists to support troops on the ground. This is how we 
will remain relevant.”61 This culture prevails in USASOAC. 
Indications for future USSOCOM airpower, along with the U.S. military as a 
whole, are positive. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, speaking during an official visit to 
USSOCOM Headquarters in October of 2017, remarked that the United States will 
“strengthen our military, and we can all see the storm clouds gathering, the additional 
challenges coming, and that means we’re going to make the military more lethal.”62 
Mattis goes on to emphasize the need for greater work with allies and partners, using the 
common USSOCOM catchphrase of “By, With, and Through.”63 The 2017 U.S. National 
Security Strategy includes the same focus. In particular, it states that the United States 
will “help our partners develop and responsibly employ the capacity to degrade and 
                                                 
60 John R. Evans, “USASOAC: Army Aviation’s Special Operations Capability for a Complex 
World” (presentation, 2017 Army Aviation Mission Solutions Summit, Nashville, TN, April 27, 2017).   
61 James McConville, “Keynote Address” (presentation, 2017 Army Aviation Mission Solutions 
Summit, Nashville, TN, April 27, 2017).   
62 “USSOCOM Update,” YouTube video, 1:03, posted by USSOCOM, Oct 17, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfWj5-I9XiI. 
63 USSOCOM, “USSOCOM Update.” 
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maintain persistent pressure against terrorists.”64 It goes on to affirm a focus on 
counterterrorism and irregular warfare:  
The Department of Defense must develop new operational concepts and 
capabilities to win without assured dominance in air, maritime, land, 
space, and cyberspace domains, including against those operating below 
the level of conventional military conflict. We must sustain our 
competence in irregular warfare, which requires planning for a long-term, 
rather than ad hoc, fight against terrorist networks and other irregular 
threats.65 
USSOCOM accomplishes much of this fight against terrorist networks and irregular 
threats with the full integration of AFSOC and USASOAC personnel and airframes.  
Beyond U.S. Government and military leadership, academics also believe in the 
future of USSOCOM. Historian Steven Biddle is one of these proponents. In a 2006 
article, Biddle advocated for a greater SOF role. In his opinion, SOF could fill roles 
beyond those currently defined and could potentially replace conventional forces during 
major combat operations.66 This model is based on the early U.S. successes in 
Afghanistan. Small U.S. Special Forces and interagency teams, partnered with Afghan 
forces and well supported by airpower, were able to achieve significant success. 
Although Biddle’s perspective is not advocated in this study, it exemplifies the general 
groundswell of academic support toward smaller, more effective, efficient, and agile 
military deployments. Biddle also wrote in a subsequent article that  
air-ground interaction is nonlinear and multiplicative, not simple and 
linearly additive … when both ground and air components contribute 
fully, the whole vastly exceeds the sum of the parts. But when either 
component is missing or inept, the result is very different. Ground and air 
forces are thus powerful together, but are poor substitutes for one another: 
                                                 
64  White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: White House, 
December 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-
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even twenty-first-century precision airpower cannot replace suitable skills 
on the ground.67 
AFSOC has adopted this perspective in its wholesale development and 
augmentation of its fleet of AC-130 Gunships. This platform, based on the ubiquitous 
Hercules transport plane, combines high-fidelity sensors, precision strike packages, and 
defensive countermeasures into a single airframe designed chiefly to provide Close Air 
Support (CAS) to SOF ground operations.68  
The United States will continue to lead the world in SOF-specific mobility, ISR, 
and precision strike. Although Canada will likely never need or want to replicate the 
scale of USSOCOM and its air assets, the comparison provides a useful metric to 
demonstrate SOF airpower capabilities that Canada could pursue, on a smaller scale, to 
ensure CANSOFCOM and the RCAF meet the needs of Canada. 
C. THE UNITED KINGDOM 
SOF units in the United Kingdom are organized in similar fashion to the United 
States but on a scale more relatable to Canada. The U.K. Director of Special Forces 
oversees all SOF units and personnel in the United Kingdom. Although the U.K. 
government is circumspect about details relating to SOF Units, U.K. Special Forces 
(UKSF) are reportedly comprised of more than 2,000 personnel in six units.69 The Joint 
Special Forces Aviation Wing was created in 2001 to provide dedicated rotary-wing 
support to UKSF.70 UKSF airframes include Wildcat, Chinooks, Eurocopter Dauphins, 
and Gazelles along with a number of fixed-wing airframes.71 Without having the scale of 
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the material of the United States, UKSF must rely on ad hoc support from the RAF for 
precision strike and for ISR and mobility beyond the tactical realm. Notwithstanding this 
smaller scale, UKSF airpower is much more well-developed than Canada’s, 
demonstrating greater capability across the spectrum of SOF operations and strong links 
to the RAF. 
Increases in personnel and funding demonstrate a bright future for UKSF. 
Historian Anthony King wrote in 2009 that “the SAS—and the Special Forces more 
widely—have increased in relative and absolute size in the past two decades. Reflecting 
this growth, the post of Director Special Forces has recently been upgraded from one-star 
to two-star status.”72 The 2015 U.K. Strategic Defence and Security Review indicated 
that investment in UKSF equipment would increase by ₤2 billion ($3.06 billion USD).73 
Importantly, out of a short two-paragraph section, air assets received specific and 
repeated mention: UKSF will have “the information they need, including through our 
investment in advanced high-altitude surveillance aircraft. We will upgrade our 
helicopters and transport aircraft so that they can deploy further and faster.”74 Once 
again, in comparison to Canada, the United Kingdom appears in a favorable position. 
The United Kingdom provides a fitting metric for comparison to CANSOFOM. 
The similarities between the two SOF commands are discernable. For example, the 
elevation of rank and influence, which occurred in the United Kingdom for the Director 
of Special Forces, correspondingly occurred for the Commander of CANSOFCOM in 
2016. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom is both better developed and better resourced for 
the future when compared to CANSOFCOM.  
D. AUSTRALIA   
In 2003, Australia created a Special Operations Command (SOCOMD) that fills a 
similar role to the SOF headquarters of the other Five Eyes partners. It acts as an 
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operational-level headquarters, reports to military and civilian governmental leadership, 
and oversees all Australian SOF units. In 2014, SOCOMD had a strength of 2,050 full-
time personnel across four operational units and three logistics and training units.75 The 
components of SOCOMD are depicted in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  2017 Components of SOCOMD.76 
SOCOMD aviation support is provided by the 6th Aviation Regiment equipped 
with Black Hawk and Kiowa helicopters.77 Other elements of ad hoc air support are 
provided by the Royal Australian Air Force, such as the MQ-4 Triton RPA, and by the 
Australian Army, such as the Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopter and Shadow 200 
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RPA.78 The Australian Defence Force (ADF) also utilizes leased airframes from civilian 
companies.79 
In 1996, a tragic training accident involving the loss of 18 personnel and 
destruction of two helicopters energized the development of SOF-specific airpower in 
Australia. (Chapter IV studies this incident in detail.) From this accident, and the more 
contemporary understanding of the joint nature of warfare, the ADF undertook a 
modernization initiative beginning in 2013 to increase joint-ness. The 2013 White Paper 
confirmed that “Special Forces are, and will continue to be, a critical component of the 
ADF.”80 While the creation and specialization of the 6th Aviation Regiment has provided 
similar benefit to Australia as USASOAC has to the United States, Australia did not 
develop an AFSOC-like equivalent. This is likely due to scale. As a middle-power—
similar to Canada—the ADF does not have the economies of scale to do so. The 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute has stated that this scale 
tends to argue against organically embedding enabling capability within 
SOCOMD. That said, given that the SOF are among the ADF elements 
most likely to be committed to a high-risk operation at short notice, the 
preparedness and capability of the necessary support elements have to be 
managed carefully to avoid unnecessary operational risks.81 
The issue of preparedness and adequate capability is critical to providing optimized SOF 
air support. Middle-power countries such as Australia and Canada grapple with this issue 
on a regular basis. 
Nevertheless, the future for Australian SOF is bright. In 2016, the Australian 
government updated its defense white paper. Specific to SOCOMD, it stated that 
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“Australia’s Special Forces will draw on a range of new capabilities from across the 
capability streams.”82 The Australian government intends on purchasing a new fleet of 
SOF-specific multi-mission helicopters as of 2025.83 These assets will provide mobility, 
and are expected to possess additional ISR and light strike capabilities.84 If this multi-
mission helicopter emerges with the ability to provide mobility, ISR, and light strike, it 
will provide SOCOMD with impressive SOF airpower capability. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter has explored what Canada’s primary military allies currently possess 
in the realm of SOF airpower. It also examined the future plans of our allies, to include 
both fixed- and rotary-wing SOF support. While the scope and scale of the United States 
is something beyond what CANSOFCOM and the RCAF need or want, AFSOC remains 
an aspirational model for examination. The various capabilities and roles of both the 
United Kingdom and Australia, both more analogous to Canada, are more likely the 
model that Canada should emulate. If this is the case, why has the development of SOF-
specific airpower not occurred in Canada in a similar fashion? Chapter IV examines this 
question. 
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IV. THE CASE FOR SOF AIRPOWER 
Never confuse enthusiasm with capability. 
—General Peter Schoomaker,  
U.S. Army85 
 
Thus, far, this study has focused broadly on the identification of the current and 
future role of CANSOFCOM in relation to the security challenges of the future and the 
SOF airpower of Canada’s primary allies. This study previously demonstrated that the 
security environment facing us will be violent and uncertain, requiring asymmetric and 
full-spectrum solutions provided best by a fully enabled SOF capability. In parallel, this 
study has also shown that like-minded nations have already adapted their SOF 
capabilities to include fully optimized SOF-specific airpower. Nevertheless, none of these 
factors justifies increasing CANSOFCOM airpower per se. Chapter IV now turns to how 
these constituent parts validate the need for Canadian SOF airpower. First, an 
examination of the historical and cultural development of air forces considers why SOF 
airpower has not yet developed. Similarly, two case studies of failure due to inadequate 
airpower show how other nations have successfully learned from tragedy—a trend that 
Canada should emulate. 
A. WHY CANADA HAS NOT CREATED SOF AIRPOWER 
In both World Wars, the Air Service improvised [close air support] 
procedures and refined them by the end of the war only to have to reinvent 
similar procedures in the next war. The reason for this was a cyclical 
devaluation of close air support in favor of strategic bombing. 
—John J. McGrath,  
Historian86 
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1. Cultural and Theoretical Roots 
Why did the RCAF not collaborate more fully with CANSOFCOM as SOF 
gained relevance after September 11, 2001? The answer begins with culture. Historically, 
air forces around the world are biased toward single-service hard power and the fixed-
wing pilot community.87 This cultural bias is puzzling. Since the outset of military flight, 
pilots began as observers for ground forces, and in particular, artillery fire. However, it 
was not long before airpower enthusiasts projected greater roles for pilots. Even before 
the First World War, Italian General Giulio Douhet believed that strategic bombing 
would become dominant and exclusive: “all that a nation does to assure her own defence 
should have as its aim procuring for herself those means which, in case of war, are most 
effective for the conquest of the command of the air.”88 Douhet believed that strategic 
bombing could “cut off the enemy’s army and navy from their bases of operation, spread 
terror and havoc in the interior of his country, and break down the moral and physical 
resistance of his people.”89 British Field Marshal Jan Smuts echoed this perspective in 
1917, purporting that aerial operations might become the “principal operations of war, to 
which the older forms of military and naval operations may become secondary and 
subordinate.”90 The culture of airpower for airpower’s sake became entrenched. 
The subjective cultural approach in favor of strategic bombing was, in some ways, 
a logical and pragmatic attempt to avoid the bloodletting of trench warfare as seen during 
the First World War. It was the hope that “air power—in the guise of strategic 
bombing—would return war to the era of short, decisive conflicts.”91 Regrettably, the 
aspirations of airpower enthusiasts were never achieved in a measurable sense. British 
RAF Bomber Command continually focused on bombing campaigns during the Second 
World War despite evidence pointing toward a lack of success. Counter-value targeting—
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deliberately targeting civilian populations—consumed more than half of Bomber 
Command’s total effort and accounted for almost 70 percent of its aircraft losses” yet 
tangible results of either operational or strategic success are questionable at best.92 
Pragmatism aside, strategic bombing did not appear to achieve success on its own. 
The greatest benefit of strategic bombing in the Second World War may have 
been achieved only indirectly. Late in the war, the RAF turned to bombing the German 
air force while planes were still on the ground and vulnerable. The focus of German 
airpower was on highly effective joint air-ground CAS in support of the German army. 
By reducing air support, the RAF decreased the overall effectiveness of the German 
army: “The strategic bombing of Germany accomplished most of its results rather too late 
in the war to be decisive either in itself or in effectively determining the outcome of the 
ground war. Strategic bombing, however, contributed to the destruction of the German air 
force which had a great and direct influence on the ground fighting.”93 Less German 
CAS, brought about by RAF bombing, resulted in a less-effective German army.  
Despite these tenuous and indirect results, the culture of strategic bombing stems 
from an irrepressible belief that strategic bombing works. The culture of bombing, along 
with the primacy of the pilot, runs deep. Distinguished pilot and historian Noble 
Frankland went so far as to claim that this culture is self-serving. On the topic of British 
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Hugh Trenchard, the father of the RAF, Frankland wrote 
that his “life’s work became, in fact, the preservation of the Royal Air Force through 
thick and through thin. His case turned upon the theory of a strategic air offensive, for 
without it there was no convincing case for the preservation of a separate air service, just 
as without it there would have been no case for its creation.”94 Bombing culture 
pervaded. 
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U.S. General Billy Mitchell—the American contemporary of Douhet—believed 
less in area bombing and more so in precision, focusing on industrial and economic 
infrastructure.95 He also had less interest in bombing itself. Mitchell campaigned for a 
balanced air element with mobility, observation, and bombing working together in 
harmony.96 This was a step in the right direction toward a balanced airpower approach 
and manifested in the American doctrine of the Air-Land Battle.97 Nevertheless, the 
culture of airpower for airpower’s sake remained. As one historian remarked in relation 
to the USAF, “while the [USAF] controlled all military aviation, including close air 
support, it did not want to do close air support [emphasis added]. However, concerned 
with its roles and missions, and true to the principle of centralization of all air assets, it 
did not want the Army to perform it in its place either.”98  
Certainly, some airpower theorists were averse to strategic bombing. One among 
them, Robert Pape, argued strongly that indiscriminate bombing campaigns have little 
effect on nationalistic ideals of a population, harden opinions against the attacker, and 
strengthen support for a particular cause.99 With the advent of precision targeting and 
stealth technology, however, advocates such as U.S. Air Force Colonel John Warden 
brought strategic bombing back to the forefront.100 
The preponderance of airpower theorists throughout history maintained and 
reinforced the primacy of the air domain, occasionally to the detriment of air forces. Air 
power theories and the primacy of air forces provided fuel to inter-service rivalries, in 
particular since they were, as author and Australian military officer Aaron P. Jackson has 
opined, “often overstated, and the concepts they developed were still, in some cases, 
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decades ahead of what contemporary technology could achieve.”101 The cultural and 
theoretical roots of airpower created a historical bias toward the single-service primacy of 
air forces. 
2. The German Air-Ground Perspective 
Despite the perspective of the majority of theorists, not all practitioners focused 
principally on air warfare. As discussed briefly earlier, the German air force was adept at 
providing CAS to ground troops. Leading up to the Second World War, the German 
military synergized the new technologies of tanks, planes, and radio to great effect. They 
developed a revolutionary approach in Blitzkrieg, and German pilots were open and 
adaptable to CAS missions due to a shared cultural understanding of the Army.102 The 
synergy between the German army and air force went even further. Historian David 
MacIssac has observed that the “role of its fighting aircraft, its airborne parachutists, and 
its air transport forces were all designed to support the operations of the Wehrmacht.”103 
This unity of effort resulted in significant early success for Germany: “it was German 
armour and aircraft that tore the Allied front to shreds and sped almost unopposed across 
French soil; the combination of tank and aircraft proved irresistible.”104 Allied forces 
eventually overcame their early defeats. This eventuality could be construed as an 
argument against CAS, but MacIssac makes a strong point: “the German use of air power 
and ground mobility set their armed forces apart from every other major state.”105 
Likewise, the Allies eventually triumphed in part—although triumph has many 
architectsbecause they began to imitate the Wehrmacht. The Allies integrated airpower 
and ground manoeuver by imitating German tactics, albeit without an equal level of swift 
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victory on the battlefield.106 Victory came about through a reduction in inter-service 
rivalry and an increase in air support to ground troops. 
3. Historical Development of the RCAF 
In the air domain, Canada began as a progeny of the United Kingdom and 
contributed approximately 25 percent of the RAF’s flying personnel during the First 
World War.107 The RCAF, as it became known in 1924, had a firm basis in U.K. doctrine 
and training. Indeed, according to the RCAF doctrine manual, it had “no written doctrine 
for offensive and defensive air operations to allow for British-Canadian interoperability; 
therefore, the RAF’s doctrine was used.”108 The Cold War era necessitated a closer 
relationship with the United States as part of the North American Air Defense Command 
(NORAD).109 Due to both influences—the United States and the United Kingdom— the 
culture of strategic bombing and strategic attack remained prominent in the RCAF. 
According to MacIssac, “establishing dominance (supremacy if possible) over the enemy 
air force was seen as in and of itself the single greatest contribution an air force could 
make to friendly surface forces.”110 RCAF culture remained relatively unchanged over 
time with the focus remaining principally on airpower for the sake of the air force while 
the security environment, at least contemporarily, requires greater interoperability 
between air forces and other elements.  
However, the security environment necessitates additional SOF-specific airpower. 
There are small indications that RCAF culture is amenable to change, albeit slowly. The 
2013 Future Concept Directive aspires to “explore alternate solutions and 
interconnections that break down our restraining traditional stovepipes of capability.”111 
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Likewise, the RCAF’s Project Laminar Strike promotes the use of the CP-140 Aurora as 
a Swiss Army knife: “more towards what a platform is capable of doing rather than what 
it is designed to do.”112 These encouraging perspectives, among other statements in the 
same documents, demonstrate a desire for a cultural shift. Greater interoperability with 
CANSOFCOM would be a tangible step in the right direction.  
B. LESSONS FROM FAILURE 
Don’t wait for a failure before standing something up. 
—Colonel (retired) Kenneth Poole, U.S. Air Force 
Veteran of Operation EAGLE CLAW113 
 
A second reason for sub-optimal and ad hoc relationships between 
CANSOFCOM and the RCAF is that Canada has thus far avoided significant operational 
failure due to airpower. Other nations have not. They have learned and adjusted through 
the anguish brought about by disaster.  
1. The United States 
U.S. Operation EAGLE CLAW was the seminal event in catalyzing the 
development of SOF Air capability. In response to the kidnapping of 52 Americans on 
November 4, 1979 in Tehran, Iran, the U.S. military launched a highly complex hostage-
rescue attempt. On an austere landing strip in the Iranian desert, a series of disastrous 
events resulted in eight U.S. deaths, destruction of two helicopters and one C-130 
Hercules transport plane, five helicopters abandoned, and classified mission documents 
left behind for Iranian exploitation.114 In the aftermath of EAGLE CLAW, most analysis 
indicates that the mission was feasible yet high risk. In direct relation to SOF airpower, 
the helicopter force and the lack of experienced pilots is often singled out as one specific 
point of failure. One Special Mission Unit Officer and Vietnam War veteran remarked:  
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God, it was a nightmare. It was a zoo. You’ve got people who are milk-
run aviators, and all of a sudden you throw them into damn night flying 
…. I’ve been in some pretty hairy places, and I’ve never been more scared 
than I was riding around in the back of those helicopters.115 
What is remarkable about this officer’s fear is that it was not caused by enemy action, but 
by a lack of trust.116  
The Holloway report, commissioned in 1980 after the failure of EAGLE CLAW, 
concluded that “the ad hoc nature of the organization and planning was related to most of 
the major issues” and recommended the creation of permanent organization to plan, train, 
and conduct counterterrorism missions.117 This would be the genesis for the creation of 
USSOCOM, and in particular, the 160th SOAR (A).118 These specific capabilities for 
U.S. SOF ensured that, in the words of past U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the 
U.S. “would never find our ambitions and our needs thwarted by our capabilities.”119 
2. Australia 
Australia was also not immune to disaster caused by sub-optimal SOF airpower. 
During Exercise DAY ROTOR 96, a 1996 domestic counterterrorism exercise, two UH-
60 Blackhawk helicopters collided mid-air, resulting in 18 deaths and 12 injuries.120 In 
the wake of the tragedy, the Australian government convened a Board of Inquiry that 
completed its work the following year. The inquiry found a number of principle factors 
contributing to the accident, as outlined in Table 4. 
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Table 4.  Principal Contributing Factors, Australian Black Hawk Training 
Accident.121 
Category Factor 
Systemic factors High rate of aircraft unserviceability in the two years 
leading up to the accident. 
High pilot separation rates. 
Immediate factors Inadequate planning for the air mission. 
Inadequate information about the target. 
Crew failure to resolve conflicting target locations. 
Conduct of the night mission differed from that of the day 
mission and there was no rehearsal of those changes. 
Helicopter Flight Lead lacked experience in leading SOF 
operations. 
 
Based on the factors identified by the inquiry, the Australian government 
instituted a number of significant changes to the ADF. Specific to SOF, the ADF 
reorganized aviation assets into specific units designated to support SOCOMD. The 6th 
Aviation Regiment and its subordinate squadrons now maintain the specific mandate to 
support SOCOMD.122 Additionally, the ADF would “establish a training sequence to 
overcome the erosion of combined skills which had previously occurred.”123 This 
training sequence increased the frequency of training events from the historical two 
weeks of annual SOF-specific training. These measures, combined with pilot retention 
strategies and various other adaptations, have greatly improved Australian SOF. In a 
1997 interview, General John Sanderson, Chief of the Australian Army, concluded that 
the “new resourcing regime and a new command regime” as a result of the inquiry had 
“improved, quite dramatically, the availability of aircraft and indeed the availability of 
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training time” for SOF crews.124 The training accident, although tragic, has resulted in 
tangible and significant improvements for the future of SOCOMD. 
3. Canada 
Thus, far, Canada has escaped such an aviation tragedy. This is not to imply, 
however, that it has avoided failure. In one well-documented historical example in 2005, 
CANSOFCOM narrowly escaped significant tragedy in Afghanistan. In June of that year, 
CANSOFCOM conducted a Direct Action mission targeting a Taliban leader and the 
improvised explosive device cell that he commanded in the village of Chernartu in the 
Sha Wali Kot valley.125 The helicopter insertion began according to plan. Upon arrival at 
the objective area, significant enemy fire resulted in one of the CH-47 Chinook 
helicopters catching fire and crash landing with all personnel onboard; this helicopter was 
destroyed, another was badly damaged, and several others sustained damage from small-
arms fire.126 Three CANSOFCOM personnel sustained injuries, including one seriously 
injured, and six other coalition members sustained wounds.127  
In the analysis of the operation, clearly the Taliban fighters strongly defended the 
objective with significant firepower. CANSOFCOM also clearly escaped relatively 
unscathed in comparison with what might have been the result. Nevertheless, some facets 
of this event are strikingly similar to the aforementioned United States and Australian 
tragedies. The U.S. air assets used for this mission were non-dedicated, relatively 
unfamiliar with CANSOFCOM, and not well suited for the quick tempo of SOF 
operations. The short-notice nature of the mission prohibited rehearsals, and the ad hoc 
nature of the relationship with the helicopter crews meant that the aircrew and ground 
force radios were incompatible with each other.  
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All of these frictions of war, as they are colloquially known, are overcome easily 
when the enemy is overcome just as easily. When the enemy exacerbates the situation, 
such as in Chenartu, tragedy is possible if not likely. The CANSOFCOM assault force 
commander on the mission in Chenartu stated “we had luck that day.”128 In recognition 
of the need for improved air assets to meet the needs of expeditionary SOF operations, 
CANSOFCOM pursued the procurement of medium-lift MI-17 HIP helicopters and 
trained 427 SOAS crews to operate them in Afghanistan as discussed in Chapter II. 
Unfortunately, this paradigm shift was only temporary. The Canadian Government 
divested itself of these expeditionary helicopters at the end of the Afghanistan mission, 
and 427 SOAS reverted to sole employment of the CH-146 Griffon.129  
The CH-146 Griffon has never been sufficient for the range of SOF operations 
conducted by Canada. In 2009, pilot and professor Bernard Brister wrote that “it is 
readily acknowledged that the Griffon is not capable of performing all the required roles 
in support of SOF operations, and it is being employed as an interim platform for the 
execution of only the most essential domestic SOF tasks until a more suitable platform 
becomes available.”130 As a member of CANSOFCOM, the author can recount 
numerous examples of degraded mission results due to non-existent fixed-wing 
surveillance assets, lack of airborne precision fire support, poor integration with 
conventional aviation assets, or a combination of all the above. CANSOFCOM and the 
RCAF learned from experience, but not in the same broad-minded manner that our allies 
did. Canada is no less motivated to deploy SOF to expeditionary theatres; the 427 SOAS 
deployment in May of 2016 to support CANSOFCOM operations in Iraq is a prime 
example of national willingness.131 For optimal employment, CANSOFCOM and the 
RCAF require greater interoperability. Canada has not yet learned from its failure, at least 
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not in an enduring way. The examples provided previously relate directly to SOF 
mobility, yet apply equally across the other missions and tasks in the air domain. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter has explored prior successes and failures specific to SOF airpower. 
Before moving on to future trends that will shape future airpower, two points deserve 
reinforcement. 
First, the Canadian Armed Forces can learn from the experiences of other nations. 
The tragedies of other countries should be lightning rods to direct RCAF and 
CANSOFCOM efforts. The experiences of the United States and Australia must 
illuminate the future for Canada, and other nations and military organizations seem to 
have done so already. In 2010, a NATO study concluded that without dedicated air assets 
its SOF elements could not execute missions for which they were otherwise capable and 
ready.132 The NATO study provides several key reasons why any alternative is sub-
optimal: Technical skills are different; common cultural understanding, values and norms 
are absent; finally, planning and rehearsal parameters vary significantly.133 NATO SOF 
require dedicated air support to achieve success. Canada should derive the same 
conclusion. 
Next, and to return to an earlier theme, the character of warfare has irrevocably 
changed. Its solutions require full joint cooperation between elements of the CAF, and 
CANSOFCOM and the RCAF are stronger together. In fact, actual, lasting, 
comprehensive solutions require one further step: interagency cooperation.134 The CAF 
must achieve true jointness between CANSOFCOM and the other elements in order to 
extend CAF effects into the other departments of the government of Canada. 
CANSOFCOM should have evolved beyond jointness by now, into a joint, inter-agency 
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and multinational organization. The benefit of introspection at this level is that it is not 
too late. Action now, including the initiatives contained within the 2017 Defence Policy 
Review and the conclusions that follow in this paper, can propel CANSOFCOM and the 
RCAF forward together. 
To improve the chances of operational success in the future, CANSOFCOM must 
develop a mature airpower capability. The development of dedicated SOF airpower is 
necessary to resolve the security challenges of the future while keeping pace with, and 
being a good partner to, peer nations. Light utility helicopters have never been sufficient 
for the broad spectrum of CANSOFCOM missions. Additional capabilities are inevitably 
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V. FUTURE TRENDS 
There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the 
improbable. 
—Thomas C. Schelling, 
Economist135 
 
Previous chapters in this study argue the case for future SOF airpower in Canada. 
This historical and theoretical examination provides a basis for why CANSOFCOM and 
the RCAF should collaborate closely in the development of future airpower. Chapter V 
now explores what is possible in this realm. Eight significant and relevant future trends 
are discussed in this chapter: 
1. Remote Piloting 
2. Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy 
3. Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination of Data 
4. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
5. Mobility 
6. Precision Strike 
7. Alternative Service Delivery  
8. Fuel Sources 
The timeline for the development and impact of each trends varies. In general, 
this study discusses trends out to the 2040s.136 Beyond the 20-year horizon, it becomes 
problematic to predict accurate trajectories. As such, numerous ill-defined trends are also 
beyond the scope of this study. For example, cybernetic enhancement, quantum 
computing, and nanotechnology are all areas of significant interest for military science 
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but lack the fidelity necessary for consideration at this time.137 As well, the concepts of 
finder-seeker, striker-shielder, and changes to the offense-defense balance are related but 
outside the scope of this study.138 The eight trends discussed are significant and relevant 
to CANSOFCOM and the RCAF and correspondingly are developed well enough to 
allow a viable estimate of their impact out to the 2040s and beyond. 
A. REMOTE PILOTING 
The faster the aircraft travel, the more necessary automated control 
becomes. 
—Frank Barnaby,  
The Automated Battlefield139 
 
The air domain now and into the future will mix planes with pilots onboard and 
those without. CANSOFCOM and the RCAF must embrace this trend. The inclusion of 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), already common practice among well-developed 
militaries, is certain. Many missions flown in support of SOF, and increasingly in support 
of conventional force missions as well, include RPA. The suite of these platforms ranges 
from hand-held, micro-, off-the-shelf varieties used by front-line tactical elements to 
medium- and high-altitude long-endurance strategic assets. Canada is currently in the 
process of procuring medium-altitude long endurance systems.140 
The terminology for RPA has evolved along with the technology. The terms 
Unmanned Aerial System, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, and Drone were all used at various 
times through the development of the technology. According to a recent U.S. study, the 
lexicon change from unmanned to remotely piloted attempts to remove any 
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misinterpretation that humans are not in control: “people misinterpreted the terminology 
and concluded that the systems operated with total autonomy.”141 The concept of 
autonomy is discussed in Trend 2. For the purposes of this study, the term RPA describes 
any asset in the air domain that does not carry a human pilot and flies either by remote 
control or by autonomous programming.142  
The history of RPA use is surprisingly long. The United States has long been 
enamored with technology and its ability to reduce risk to human pilots. According to 
Lieutenant Colonel Bob Bateman, previously from the Pentagon’s venerated Office of 
Net Assessment, the U.S. military has historically encouraged the use of remotely piloted 
systems for this very reason: the preference exists, “extant since the Second World War, 
that the United States will always spend money instead of lives if at all possible. 
Exacerbating that is a trend towards preferences for increasingly complex systems.”143 
While the risk reduction factor of remotely piloted flight might appear as recently as the 
Second World War, the actual technical ability to fly without a pilot has existed as long 
as flight itself. Both rail-car and motor-vehicle launched versions of rudimentary pilotless 
“aerial torpedoes” existed in concept and early design during the First World War.144  
Today, RPA represent more than 70 percent of the American inventory of 
platforms in the air domain.145 A report from the U.S. Air Force Air University 
concluded that technology does not prevent the replacement of piloted fixed-wing assets 
with remotely piloted variants, and that, in some situations, the human pilot is the 
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limiting factor.146 It appears likely that most future military air assets will be remotely 
piloted. One AFSOC pilot states it simply: “The only reason to put pilots in the front is if 
there are operators in the back.”147 
The CAF’s forays into RPA came from humble beginnings in Afghanistan, 
relying on sub-par, short-term leased versions. A permanent solution for Canada requires 
procuring “interoperable, network-enabled Unmanned Aircraft Systems to provide 
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Target Acquisition and all-weather precision 
strike capabilities in support of CAF operations worldwide.”148 Long-delayed but highly 
anticipated, RPA will operationally enhance CANSOFCOM and the CAF as a whole. 
The current Chief of Defence Staff, General John Vance, has voiced his support for RPA: 
“If [a target] needs to be struck to advance our tactical or strategic objectives, it will be 
struck,” concluding, “If we don’t have a UAV, we’re going to use artillery or a jet. UAVs 
are more precise.”149  
RPA use is diffusing. Beyond state-level employment by the CAF, commercial, 
off-the-shelf micro-RPA are affordable for the general population to purchase, something 
on which both allies and enemies have capitalized. It was widely reported that the Islamic 
State employed rudimentary homemade RPA armed with explosives in Iraq and Syria. 
Although the effects were relatively limited—several casualties only—the resources 
required to combat this new threat, along with the indirect psychological effects, had a 
much deeper impact.150 This example demonstrates the democratization of airpower: a 
lowering threshold for ownership of effective technology in the air domain. According to 
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an advisor for Commander CANSOFCOM, this reduced barrier to entry is a new 
airpower reality, in which  
everyone has their own integral air force. UAS are likely the first step in 
this and that trend is only increasing.... [T]he idea that airpower can stay 
centralized under a single controlling entity is fundamentally flawed 
moving forward.… [T]he interface between SOF and Air is not only 
shifting location but also in fundamental nature (e.g., from shopkeeper-to-
customer to shopkeeper-to-shopkeeper).151 
One may defer the notion of phasing out manned flight completely, but RPA are 
increasingly the preferred alternative for missions that are overly long, dull, or high 
risk.152 Remotely piloted airpower is certain to become more prevalent in future war. As 
an example of the trend, the U.S. military had an inventory of almost 11,000 RPA as of 
July 2013, and more than 87 other nation-states employ them for military use.153 The 
employment of RPA is certain. A better question is whether manned assets will continue 
to fly in their current numbers. 
B. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND AUTONOMY 
AIs might get out of control and treat us the way we treat ants, for their 




                                                 
151 CANSOFCOM Officer, name withheld, email message to author, March 21, 2017. For more on 
the democratization of airpower, see T.X. Hamm, “The Democratization of Airpower: The Insurgent and 
the Drone,” War on the Rocks, October 18, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/the-democratization-
of-airpower-the-insurgent-and-the-drone/. 
152 The U.S. Department of Defense refers to these types of missions as dull, dirty, or dangerous. U.S. 
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY 2013–2038 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013), 20. 
153 For U.S. statistics, see U.S. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unmanned Systems 
Integrated Roadmap, 5. For international statistic, see P.W. Singer, “Foreword,” Shawn Brimley, Ben 
FitzGerald and Kelley Sayler, “Game Changers: Disruptive Technology and U.S. Defense Strategy,” 
Center for a New American Security, September 2013, https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/
CNAS_Gamechangers_BrimleyFitzGeraldSayler.pdf?mtime=20160906081305.  




Some concepts of AI and autonomy are as murky as they are prevalent. The 
government of Canada defines AI as “intelligent computer programs that can solve 
problems, learn from experience, understand language, interpret visual scenes, and, in 
general, behave in a way that would be considered intelligent if observed in a human.”155 
No doctrinal military definition of machine autonomy currently exists although the 
Oxford English Dictionary defines it as a machine or apparatus that is “capable of 
carrying out, without supervision, tasks typically performed by humans.”156 Autonomy 
should not be considered binary, but rather a condition with a sliding scale. Defense 
Scientist Robert Sadowski, in a U.S. Army conference presentation, discussed the 
relationship between autonomy and humans as outlined in Table 5. 
Table 5.  Levels of Machine Autonomy157 
Level of autonomy Description Relationship to 
Humans 
Non-autonomous Remote control. No autonomy in 
the system. 
Human in the Loop via 
remote control 
Semi-autonomous Machines wait for human input 
before taking action. 
Human in the Loop 
Supervised autonomous Humans can intervene in real time. Human on the Loop 
Fully autonomous No ability for human to intervene 
in real time. 
Human out of the Loop 
 
The concept of Humans in the Loop is a relationship between machines and 
humans in which the human has sole authority to decide when and how to employ the 
machine.158 This concept correlates with Humans on the Loop, in which a human may 
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choose to enter into an autonomous decision-making cycle to exercise control of the 
machine.159  
The progression toward full autonomy is well underway. Consider, for instance, 
that much of commercial air travel is flown by autopilot despite the presence of a human 
pilot. For militaries, some analysts predict that full automation will become just as 
prevalent. Among them, defense analyst Frank Barnaby has written that “as computers 
become more able to make decisions, we must expect the military to use them to their full 
capacity.”160 There is certainly also an element of a security dilemma present, in which a 
nation-state like Canada may feel compelled to developed autonomous military 
capabilities because it knows other nation-states or non-state actors will do the same.  
While the capability for full automation exists, several key characteristics of 
warfare keep humans involved. For nation-states, international treaties and laws of war, 
political considerations, and the natural reluctance for large bureaucracies to cede power 
will all reduce the likelihood for acceptance of full automation.  
There are technological reasons for humans to remain in the loop as well. First, 
even though the technology of AI and autonomy is advancing rapidly, in most cases 
humans are more discerning than a machine. For example, an autonomous asset cannot 
currently differentiate a wounded soldier from a healthy one or a chaplain from a fighter, 
and may never be capable of human-level discernment.161 Good AI is only as good as the 
humans who build it. Machines that learn how to act ethically and morally may never be 
possible. Authors Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen put this into perspective: “it is, of 
course, hard enough for humans to develop their own virtues, let alone developing 
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appropriate virtues for computers.”162 As such, military and political leaders will likely 
never cede control of lethal force to a machine.163  
Additionally, autonomous and intelligent machines are brittle. They can achieve 
performance levels far beyond humans, but only in narrow domains. Futurist Paul 
Scharre describes this well: “when pushed outside the boundaries of their programming, 
however, they can fail—and fail badly. They can go from super smart to super dumb in 
an instant. Unlike humans, machines cannot flexibly adapt to novel situations.”164 
Without the ability to evolve, autonomous machines are brittle. This brittleness limits 
military utility. 
Machines are also increasingly complex, which may result in unintended 
consequences. Scharre comments that “machine learning with giant datasets and huge, 
inscrutable black box deep neural networks can lead to some surprises.”165 Practical 
examples of this weakness exist outside of the military. For example, the algorithms 
controlling insurance adjustment and stock trading are so complex and opaque that they 
defy human understanding, while at the same time, in particular in the stock-trading 
example, they are becoming indispensable.166 The trading algorithms conduct up to 70 
percent of trading volume and gain their complexity when they interact with each other: 
“simple instructions that interact to create a market that is incomprehensible to the human 
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mind and impossible to predict. For better or worse, the computers are now in 
control.”167  
The theme of complexity creating unintended consequences is reinforced by a 
recent glitch by Facebook’s algorithm. At one point in 2017, according to The New York 
Times, the algorithm allowed advertisers to target groups of people identified by slurs and 
offensive language.168 The Facebook algorithm knew that doing so was in the company’s 
best interest on a superficial level without understanding the greater impact. Sheryl 
Sandberg, Facebook Chief Operating Officer, admitted both fault and incomprehension in 
a telling statement: “we never intended or anticipated this functionality being used this 
way—and that is on us.”169 In this case, inappropriate action by a business algorithm in 
this case was a social and commerce problem. Conversely, when it comes to application 
of lethal force by a nation-state, mistakes by AI may have significantly higher 
consequences.170 The complexity of machines has direct impact on military use. 
Perhaps, however, the problem of autonomous algorithms is a lack of complexity, 
not the other way around. The examples of insurance, stock trading, and Facebook 
algorithms show complexity during their employment that defies human understanding, 
but the machines are not yet self-aware and therefore able to pursue self-improvement. 
Perhaps more complexity is required such that machines may correct themselves. 
Consider the perspective of Kevin Kelly, founding executive editor for Wired magazine, 
about the coming ubiquity of machine learning: “AI will enliven inert objects, much as 
electricity did more than a century ago. Everything that we formerly electrified, we will 
now cognitize.”171 Surely the opposition and fear surrounding AI will dissipate much as 
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it did for electricity at the turn of the last century.172 As opposition and fear dissipate, AI 
will come to be more and more depended on by military forces. 
AI is likely to mature to the point that machines are trusted to make accurate first-
order decisions. Nevertheless, they may never achieve human-level intuition. According 
to authors John R. Allen and Amir Hussein, “in this coming age of hyperwar, we will see 
humans providing broad, high-level inputs while machines do the planning, executing, 
and adapting to the reality of the mission and take on the burden of thousands of 
individual decisions with no additional input.”173 Autonomous and intelligent machines 
are here to stay. Humans will remain in or on the loop across the spectrum of missions in 
the air domain but will recede further and further as technology advances. 
C. PROCESSING, EXPLOITATION, AND DISSEMINATION 
We have laid out our own electric networks on a global scale.... [T]hese 
circuits are loaded with data that move instantly and which have become 
indispensable to all decision-making in the western world. 
—Marshall McLuhan, 1965174 
As the information domain becomes increasingly important in warfare, military 
organizations must achieve better decision-quality information faster than their 
opponents. Notwithstanding all the sophisticated collection assets discussed in detail in 
previous sections, the sheer depth and breadth of unstructured data requiring processing, 
exploitation and dissemination (PED) is a daunting challenge for any military element. 
Commanders have access to an overall increase of data, and this data must enable 
decisions. While working for the RAND Corporation in the 1990s, John Arquilla and 
David Ronfeldt proposed that maneuver and firepower no longer dominate warfare: 
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“What distinguishes the victors is their grasp of information.”175 In the book Turning 
Point, historian Kenneth Allard noted that decision makers in the First Gulf War were 
“enabled” with 700,000 telephone calls, 152,000 data messages, and 35,000 tactical radio 
frequencies.176 The unquestionable increase in connectivity since that time, predicated on 
Moore’s Law, suggests that recent conflicts are no less awash in data. Nevertheless, 
information must enable decisions, not paralyze them. The author can personally recall 
clunky early versions of Blue Force Tracker technology in the Canadian Army’s fleet of 
Light Armoured Vehicles that physically inhibited the movement of the crew while 
providing no discernable advantage for command and control. Connectivity and data can 
easily overwhelm as much as they can help.  
Therefore, information systems are helpful only when they reduce the fog of war. 
In fact, Allard implored commanders to succeed without technological assistance: “The 
command structure is the one part of a military organization that, more than any other, 
must function as a weapon of war. It must either be a lethal, predatory weapon, capable 
of preying upon and killing other command structures—or else it runs the risk of 
becoming a bizarre, expensive techno-gaggle more likely to generate friction than to 
reduce it.”177 To achieve an advantage over adversaries, military organizations must 
translate data into decisions. 
Paradoxically, the creation of data may actually result in good data lost among the 
rest. In this case, more of something is not necessarily better, and may actually mask 
small but critical data points. A good example of this stems from the First Gulf War and 
the Air Tasking Order (ATO). The ATO was created in Saudi Arabia by U.S. Central 
Command and subsequently disseminated throughout the deployed forces.178 It was a 
complex document, over 300 pages of text-based data and, as all ATOs are, a key 
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element of the targeting function and the mechanics of modern warfighting. 
Unfortunately, all the various data systems in the U.S. military could not talk to each 
other or deal with the magnitude of the ATO. As a result, the document required U.S. 
personnel to physically courier it to various end-users with degraded results.179 More 
does not mean better, and may overly complicate important decision-making processes. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that even greater amounts of data will be required in the future, 
since good data cannot be reverse-engineered after the need for it is identified. Effective 
militaries must embrace big data and ably sift through it for wisdom.  
Further complicating the ability to make decisions with increased data, the speed 
of war continues to accelerate, necessitating a corresponding increase in the speed of 
PED. Prior to the Second World War, war was fought at the speed of rail and telegraph. 
Tanks, trucks, aircraft, and radio technology quickened this pace to battles won or lost in 
days, hours, and sometimes minutes. Today, with the information revolution, war is 
fought in a matter of seconds. Lightning-quick attacks with automated kinetic or cyber 
weapons have far-ranging strategic effects.180 Decision making, then, must also 
accelerate at pace. With an ever-more complicated environment from which to make 
decisions despite imperfect knowledge, commanders struggle to maintain an information 
advantage. The speed of war reinforces the criticality of information systems in future 
warfare. 
One solution for the challenge of the knowledge advantage is simply to get better 
at synthesizing big data into decisions. The current, novel glut of data does not need to 
overwhelm us as we have the technical capacity to process it. Indeed, others have 
previously solved this problem. At the turn of the 19th century, writer and statesman 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe wrote that “The modern age has a false sense of superiority 
because of the great mass of data at its disposal, but the valid criterion of distinction is 
rather the extent to which man knows how to form and master the material at his 
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command.”181 During the American Civil War, despite the preponderance of telegraph 
reporting across a significantly vast area of operations, U.S. General-in-Chief Ulysses 
Grant boiled the problem down to its essence: “Find out where your enemy is ... strike at 
him as hard as you can and as often as you can, and keep moving on.”182 During the 
Second World War, German panzer division HQs received great amounts of data yet they 
functioned well, partially due to their prior willingness to decentralize authority through 
the First World War concept of Auftragstaktik or Mission Command. Israeli Moshe 
Dayan replicated similar results through Optional Control.183 Likewise, the British Chain 
Home radar stations and the Observer Corps achieved timely processing and structuring 
of enemy air movement data into decisions. Success in the Battle of Britain, however, 
was perhaps more a result of philosopher C. West Churchman’s systems approach: 
Winning by viewing technology and people as “sets of components that work together for 
the overall objective of the whole.”184 Successful militaries are capable of synthesizing 
big data through innovative approaches. 
The military complex has successfully and broadly surmounted data challenges in 
the past. The challenge posed by modern-day big data is not fundamentally different from 
these historical challenges. Intelligent, autonomous sensors must increasingly deliver 
decision-quality information vice raw data. The challenge for modern and future 
militaries is to turn it into wisdom. 
D. INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE 
The technological advances projected for ISR assets are significant and are nested 
in a number of the other trends discussed in this chapter. The government of Canada 
defines ISR as “an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of 
all collection capabilities with processing and dissemination of the resulting information 
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to the right person, at the right time, in the right format, in support of operations.”185 
Functionally, the term ISR refers to the various sensors that collect data for military and 
intelligence purposes.  
In its simplest interpretation, airborne ISR sensors are helicopters or planes 
manned by pilots and sensor operators. Airborne ISR tasks are assigned more frequently 
to fixed-wing assets since they historically provide more varied range, loiter time, 
payload, and altitude than their rotary-wing cousins. The future benefits and drawbacks 
between fixed- and rotary-wing platforms is discussed more fully in Trend 4, mobility.  
Regardless of the means of propulsion, the preponderance of future airborne ISR 
platforms will be remotely piloted. This reduces both payload and human risk while 
increasing range and loiter time. It conversely increases response time and renders the 
communications downlink a critical component. The decision to either include a pilot or 
do so remotely will, in the future, involve a “crossover point when remote capability 
eclipses manned assets. At that time it does not make sense to fly manned anymore.”186 
This crossover point is not likely in this decade or next, and for some “gold plated” 
bespoke ISR requirements such as high-end signals intelligence collection, it may never 
arise. Nevertheless, the future of airborne ISR in aggregate is trending toward RPA.  
Once the pilot is remoted-in instead of onboard, the payload for an ISR platform 
significantly decreases. This increases loiter time and decreases the complexity of 
operating at higher altitudes, providing persistent coverage at altitudes beyond most 
countries’ air defense systems. Current examples of what is technologically possible exist 
in this realm. China’s CH-T4 solar powered high-altitude drone flies for months at a time 
and covers almost 650,000 square kilometers at a time with radio and visual coverage.187 
Similarly, in 2016 the British government purchased three ultra-lightweight high-altitude 
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pseudo satellites, which fly at an altitude of 70,000 feet for up to 45 days at a time.188 
These impressive loiter times and altitudes are possible with current technology but only 
when the human pilot is removed. Pilots are less probable in future SOF mission sets. 
The line between high-altitude aircraft and low-earth orbit satellites for ISR 
purposes has begun to blur. One simple characteristic differentiates satellites and planes: 
satellites orbit while planes hover and fly. Beyond this designation, the technologies are 
merging to provide the persistence of a satellite and the responsiveness of a plane. Low-
earth orbit satellites are abundant. The U.S. Army’s Kestrel Eye micro-satellite, currently 
in orbit, is a “small, low-cost, visible-imagery satellite providing images rapidly to the 
tactical-level ground warfighter.”189 Civilian companies offer similar, and arguably more 
permeating, options.190 The drawbacks of space-based ISR systems is what one USAF 
officer called the “tyranny of persistence.”191 The more persistent a sensor is, the farther 
from its target it must be. By bringing a sensor closer, such as a low-earth orbit satellite, 
its sensors have more fidelity, but it orbits the earth faster. Technology can overcome 
these limitations to some degree. The current solution is to place increasingly more 
satellite constellations into space. 
The government of Canada also plans to evolve its satellites into a constellation 
beginning in 2018, to provide “complete imaging of Canada and its maritime approaches 
on a daily basis, and partial coverage internationally.”192 According to the Canadian 
Department of National Defence, space initiatives contained in the 2017 Defence Policy 
will “improve the identification and tracking of threats and improve situational awareness 
of routine traffic in and through Canadian territory … and improve tactical narrow- and 
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wide-band communications globally, including throughout Canada’s Arctic region.”193 
Just as anyone may now have their own micro RPA air force, the threshold for who 
possesses space-based assets has lowered.  
Other more novel options for future airborne ISR also exist. Toronto-based 
company Solar Ship has prototyped hybrid dirigible-solar airplanes designed to carry 
payloads into remote areas such as Canada’s north or undeveloped areas in Africa. Their 
hybrid aircraft operate without fixed infrastructure for take-off and landing and aspire to 
carry a payload of 30,000 kilograms for more than 2,000 kilometers.194 The Canadian 
government has considered hybrid air vehicles to replace rail and road infrastructure in 
the north.195 There is an ISR application for dirigibles, one that the U.S. Army has 
experimented with previously as the Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle.196 
With technological improvements to come in high altitude planes, low-earth orbit 
satellites, dirigibles, and other less-well-known-platforms, the omnipresence of future 
remotely piloted ISR platforms is certain.197 
The employment of future ISR platforms is governed by two general concepts: a 
mothership or a swarm. In the mothership concept, a large platform such as a CC-130 
Hercules controls, launches, and recovers smaller RPA in a hub-and-spoke concept. In 
this particular example, described by political scientist and futurist P.W. Singer, the RPA 
“fly in and out of the cargo bay in the back, turning the plane into an aircraft carrier that 
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is actually airborne.”198 The mothership concept allows for centralized control while 
achieving dispersed coverage of sensor platforms. It also presents a single point of failure 
if the mothership becomes incapacitated. In the swarm concept, highly mobile, 
individually autonomous RPA self-organize, like a flock of birds, into highly effective 
groups. According to the original forecasters of swarm tactics, an effective swarm must 
have large numbers of small units that create a sensory organization and are “tightly 
internetted—i.e., that can communicate and coordinate with each other at will, and are 
expected to do so.”199 While the mothership has centralized control and decentralized 
execution, a swarm has the exact opposite. As such, a swarm has no single point of 
failure. These two concepts appear exclusionary, but are likely complementary in nature. 
The benefit of a mothership able to provide life-cycle management to a swarm of RPA 
from outside of contested airspace seems intuitively beneficial.  
The notion of contested airspace brings up a significant challenge for future 
airborne ISR platforms. The penetration of sovereign airspace, in particular that of peer 
and near-peer adversaries who possess well-developed electronic warfare anti-access 
technology, is increasingly difficult. One way that the U.S. military has solved this 
problem is by combining remote piloting and stealth technology. Stealth RPA, such as 
the RQ-180, should possess the capability to penetrate contested and denied airspace.200 
Future ISR platforms will be remotely piloted, increasingly autonomous, and 
sourced from both military forces and civilian companies. They will operate in air and 
space, use alternative fuel sources, and remain persistently aloft. These platforms will be 
increasingly capable, omnipresent, and unbounded by altitude, range, or payload. 
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E. SOF MOBILITY 
Mobility, in general military terms, is the capability of a force to “move from 
place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission.”201 SOF 
mobility—the insertion and extraction of SOF personnel—is a core capability. In an 
article on SOF mobility, Jane’s Defence wrote that 
almost no aspect of SOF operations is riskier than insertion—the delivery 
of small numbers of personnel and equipment into a target area, often in 
the vicinity of numerically superior enemy forces. Only extraction under 
duress may be more dangerous, and that usually requires employment of 
the same assets.202 
It appears certain that, in the air domain, these critical insertion and extraction tasks will 
be increasingly allocated to rotary-wing assets, for technological advancements position 
them as the platform of choice for SOF missions. Future aviation platforms are trending 
in two different directions, both with longer combat ranges, faster speeds, and capable of 
operating in higher and hotter conditions than today. First is the compound helicopter, 
exemplified by the S-97 Raider. With two coaxial counter-rotating main blades coupled 
with a rear thrust propeller, the Raider and other variants achieve significantly increased 
speed without any drastic reduction in range, capacity, or auxiliary capabilities.203 These 
compound helicopters will likely demonstrate slower speeds than their tilt-rotor 
competitors, but may demonstrate increased manoeuverability and agility on the 
objective.204  
The second direction for future vertical lift is the tilt-rotor platform, exemplified 
by the V-280 Valor. This category blends the vertical takeoff and landing of a helicopter 
with the speed and rangeand eventually payloadof a fixed-wing aircraft. The future 
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of tilt-rotor technology looks bright, with the Valor providing a fast, precise vertical 
takeoff mobility platform.205 The speed of the Valor may also has trade-offs, since 
today’s tilt-rotor aircraft generate increased down wash effects, and the Valor’s 
maneuverability and agility has yet to be proven in flight tests.206  
The tilt-rotor concept may have a technological advantage over other options in 
that it scales up remarkably well. Although a larger tilt-rotor platform would be less 
maneuverable than the Valor, by the 2040s, it may achieve similar payloads to that of a 
CC-130 Hercules.207 Regardless of the direction, either compound helicopters or tilt-
rotor, it appears that the payload and range differences between helicopters and fixed-
wing assets will continue to merge in the tactical realm. For all but heavy lift, a future 
SOF planner is likely to choose a precision asset instead of one requiring fixed 
infrastructure for take-off and landing. 
F. PRECISION STRIKE 
SOF operations will continue to require precision fire support in the future. This 
support may come from ground-based or maritime platforms but will primarily be 
provided by air forces. Precision strike is the capability of a military force to target and 
strike an objective with meticulous timing and accuracy. This strike can be achieved with 
conventional unguided munitions, guided bombs and missiles, and, increasingly, 
electronic and cyber means. 
Of the multiple offensive roles and missions of air forces, precision strike is the 
one most applicable to ground forces and to SOF in particular. As an indication of this 
significance, the U.S. Congress cancelled the impending retirement of the USAF’s 
venerable A-10 Warthog. According to open source reporting, “much of the leadership 
within the Air Force [was] keen to retire the A-10 so that the resources used to maintain 
                                                 
205 Gareth Jennings, “Bell’s Valor Tiltrotor Comes Together Ahead of 2017 First Flight,” Jane’s by 
IHS Markit, January 20 2016, http://www.janes.com/article/57314/bell-s-valor-tiltrotor-comes-together-
ahead-of-2017-first-flight. 
206 USSOCOM Program Executive Officer for Rotary Wing, February 7, 2018. 
207 Bell Textron personnel, personal conversation with the author, April 26, 2016. 
 66 
the fleet can be pumped into the fifth-generation F-35 program.”208 However, the high 
demand for the A-10, as the premier close air support (CAS) platform—other than the 
AC-130 gunship—makes it a constant go-to asset in support of ground forces.209 The 
trend of supporting a joint air-ground battle is one that will continue into the future as 
attempts in recent history to achieve decisive victory without committing ground forces 
have failed. In the rare and unlikely event that a future conflict does not involve SOF in 
some capacity, it will certainly involve proxy forces, civilians in need of defending, and 
other contingencies. Precision strike is a future necessity, in both kinetic and electronic 
forms. 
An informative examination of future precision strike is the juxtaposition between 
the F-35 Lightning II and the relatively simple light attack platforms in the U.S. OA-X 
program. This juxtaposition illustrates the debate between expensive, complex strategic 
platforms and ones that are simple, abundant, and tactically focused. The future of 
strategic airpower was intended to rest on fifth-generation stealth fighters which blend a 
high-technology airframe with a human pilot. With production delays, cost overruns, and 
sponsors (such as Canada) withdrawing from the program, however, the F-35 seems 
fraught with problems.210 Nevertheless, the program continues, with a current cost per 
plane of approximately $100 million.211 This cost is likely unworkable for the RCAF, 
which has a short-term need for a replacement airframe, while defense spending on large-
scale capital projects deferred by just over $3.7 billion from the 2016 budget.212 The 
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2017 Defence Policy backed away from previous government commitments to purchase 
the F-35, indicating plans for procurement of 88 “advanced fighter aircraft” without 
specifying more details.213 F-35 costs have raised the ire of others as well: U.S. President 
Donald Trump at one point tweeted that “based on the tremendous cost and cost overruns 
of the Lockheed Martin F-35, I have asked Boeing to price-out a comparable F-18 Super 
Hornet!”214 Plagued by problems, the F-35 program continues to purport that its fighter 
jets will fill a multi-role function, including CAS. 
Juxtaposed with the titanic F-35 is the A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft, 
one of the OA-X contenders. The A-29 costs a mere $10 million and performs multiple 
roles including precision strike and surveillance and reconnaissance.215 Its utility should 
not be overstated: the A-29 certainly cannot replace the platform requirement necessary to 
compete for air superiority or defend Canada’s north as part of our NORAD 
commitments. It is not a stealth fighter or fifth-generation aircraft and as such is likely 
unable to penetrate near-peer air defenses. Nevertheless, it is the platform most suitable 
for the most likely types of conflict Canada will face. 
Exceptional technology simplifies the end-user experience. Consider the modern 
automobile—a highly complex machine running upwards of 100 million lines of 
computer code.216 This complicated conglomeration of metal and plastic remains, in 
most cases, easy for a relatively inexperienced individual to drive safely. The auto 
industry has done well to simplify the end-user experience, which directly translates a test 
drive into a sale at the cash register. A modern smart phone is similar. Military 
technology often is not.  
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For cases in which high-tech items are not simple for the end-user, a number of 
negative consequences are clear. First, the user may only use a fraction of the computing 
power that the item possesses. Next, it might take a significant amount of training time to 
allow the user to leverage the technology’s advantages. This is the F-35 experience: one 
test pilot wrote “the F-35 is in its seventh year of flight test and still has a few more years 
to go.... [W]e’re still learning what the F-35 can do, and we need people who know the 
airplane and can continue to drive it to its ultimate performance.”217 This idea is key—
the struggle to build enough experience in the F-35 to fly it at its peak performance, 
achieving technological overmatch against a capable adversary, is a real struggle. Last, 
great technology not simplified for users will remain just that: great tech. In order to have 
great utility, it must be simplified and packaged well.  
OA-X avoids the negative consequences of the F-35 through the simplicity of its 
technology. The program, in a paradoxical way, also complements the F-35. After 
running field trials for the A-29 and three other similar platforms, the USAF deemed that 
it could  
remove some of the burden from faster-moving attack aircraft built for 
more contested airspace. Current U.S. enemies have no air defense 
networks to speak of, so jaw-dropping aircraft performance and 
sophisticated countermeasures are largely wasted. Add OA-X to the mix, 
and the advanced aircraft can go back to doing what they are built for: 
Flying through, and laying waste to, top-notch air defenses.218 
Not only does OA-X complement the F-35, it also helps the soldiers on the ground in 
ways that the F-35 cannot. In a RAND study from 2017, many ground commanders from 
the Afghanistan campaign expressed a preference for CAS guns, such as those on the A-
10 and the OA-X, over precision bombs. This preference is because the guns are “highly 
accurate, better able to hit moving targets than even precision bombs, and produce less 
collateral damage than bombs. Also, many missions involved a show of force, in which 
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aircraft flew low and slow over the U.S. ground forces to deter adversary activity.”219 
This preference also extends to more recent conflicts.220 The OA-X light attack aircraft 
cannot do everything, but they provide an optimal link between airpower and ground 
forces. Benefits and tradeoffs exist between high-end and low-end assets, and an 
optimized air force has a mix of both. 
G. ALTERNATIVE SERVICE DELIVERY 
Future air forces will blend military assets with civilian-owned resources arranged 
through the mechanism of Alternative Service Delivery (ASD). The government of 
Canada defines this arrangement as a method of improving performance in “delivering 
programs and services to citizens and businesses. It includes the following mechanisms: 
privatization, franchising/licensing, public-private partnerships, purchase of service, 
devolution, delegated administrative authority, and agency and direct delivery.”221 The 
involvement of contracted support to military operations has increased significantly over 
the past decades as depicted in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  Contractors per U.S. Uniformed Military Personnel, 2014.222 
Contractor support to U.S. operations extend beyond the conflicts depicted in Figure 5. In 
Africa, for example, USSOCOM units employ contractors for various tasks and missions. 
During Operation OBSERVANT COMPASS in Uganda, civilian companies provided air 
resupply, manned ISR, casualty evacuation, and psychological operations support.223 
U.S. AFRICOM has also successfully used contracted fixed- and rotary-wing assets in 
operational theatres with success, and recently awarded new medium-term contracts to 
three separate air mobility providers.224 Several successful Canadian military examples 
confirm the benefits to these partnerships as well. The RCAF Contracted Airborne 
Training Services program uses civilian pilots and airframes to provide live-flying 
instruction as part of fighter pilot training.225 ASD can also easily extend beyond the 
training realm. PAL Aerospace, headquartered in Canada, purports to have already 
provided over 250,000 hours of airborne ISR in support of military and law enforcement 
                                                 
222 Adapted from Micah Zenko, “You Might Have Missed: Defense Contractors, ISIS, Syria, and 
Cyber Threats,” Council for Foreign Relations, August 28, 2014, https://www.cfr.org/blog/you-might-
have-missed-defense-contractors-isis-syria-and-cyber-threats. 
223 Bo C. Andersen and Niels B. Arleth, “Mitigating the Shortage of Special Operations Aviation by 
an Unconventional Approach” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), 55–56. 
224 Gareth Jennings, “USTRANSCOM to Award Nearly USD 1 Billion in Contractor Helicopter 
Support,” Jane’s by IHS Markit, May 12, 2017, http://www.janes.com/article/70324/ustranscom-to-award-
nearly-usd1-billion-in-contractor-helicopter-support. 




missions.226 In times of relative fiscal constraint, the lease vs. buy flexibility provided by 
ASD reduces cost for the RCAF and CANSOFCOM. It also opens up flexibility for 
CANSOFCOM that the RCAF cannot provide. In 2014, the Global and Mail reported 
that reduction of the CC-144 Challenger fleet would mean the “air force may have to use 
larger, more costly aircraft for important military missions, including medical 
evacuation.”227 Outsourcing access to platforms, perhaps even with outsourced crews, 
solves future resource scarcity. Contracted civilian aircraft via ASD would ease pressure 
on scarce RCAF resources while providing much-needed operational flexibility to 
CANSOFCOM well into the future. 
There are options other than employing civilians during military operations. As a 
hybrid model, AFSOC created a non-standard aviation program to employ low-signature 
commercial aircraft, flown by AFSOC crews, for SOF missions.228 This program was 
designed to operate during low profile, small footprint missions, and bridges the gap 
between civilian contractors and full-visibility standard military aircraft.229 
The concept of adapting assets for alternate use may also be applied to current 
RCAF platforms in order to provide SOF-specific mission capabilities. This is a novel 
solution with significant potential for CANSOFCOM. The U.S. Marine Corps achieved 
something similar with their UH-1 Huey platforms, in which they upgraded a portion of 
their fleet into more powerful light-attack helicopters while maintaining 85 percent 
commonality of parts.230 This same style of upgrade, applied to the Griffon Limited-Life 
                                                 
226 “Airborne Special Mission Operations,” PAL Aerospace, accessed 15 May 2017, 
https://www.palaerospace.com/#airbornespecialmissionoperations2. 
227 Murray Brewster, “Cuts to Challenger Jets Leave Air Force Juggling VIP, Military Medevac 
Roles,” Globe and Mail, July 2, 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/cuts-to-challenger-
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228 Marc V. Schanz, “The SOF Makeover,” Air Force Magazine, June 2010, 
http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/June%202010/0610SOF.aspx. 
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65, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/27918. 
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Extension, would benefit CANSOFCOM airframes.231 Further, more short-term 
variations of this concept include lightweight, rapidly reconfigurable weapon and sensor 
mounts for the Griffon helicopter.232 With a system such as this, CANSOFCOM 
helicopters could quickly re-role from mobility platforms to precision fire support. As 
well, this concept is applicable beyond helicopters. The concept of roll-on/roll-off, 
applied across the spectrum of RCAF platforms, allows greater flexibility and operational 
relevance for CANSOFCOM through alternate means of delivery. Air support from non-
traditional sources is a viable option in the Canadian context. 
H. FUEL SOURCES 
The cost and environmental impact of carbon fuel sources will continue to push 
militaries to develop alternative fuel sources. The U.S. Navy began this process with The 
Great Green Fleet, a program designed to help their ships and aircraft “go farther, stay 
longer and deliver more firepower” through, among other things, advanced biofuel.233 As 
well, a USAF study in 2007 concluded that ocean-grown algae biofuel offers a “secure 
energy source” and, with more testing, could replace high quality jet fuel from a secure 
domestic source with zero-sum environmental costs.234 Similarly, USSOCOM is 
currently fielding solar wings on its fleet of RQ-20A Puma RPA.235  
Power for RCAF airframes will one day originate from perpetual fuel sources 
such as solar power. In the foreseeable future, however, planes and helicopters will 
continue to refuel regularly. There are two viable tactical refueling options, from either in 
the air or on the ground. Air-to-air refueling has long been a standard practice for fixed-
                                                 
231 The up-SOFing of 427 SOAS Griffons would preserve a common airframe while meeting future 
SOF requirements for mobility and fire support. For more, see Canadian American Strategic Review, 
“Griffon Grows Up: ‘Hot-and-High’ Helicopters for Special Operations?,” Accessed March 2, 2016, 
https://web-beta.archive.org/web/20160530033612/http://www.casr.ca:80/mp-griffon-soa-helicopter.htm. 
232 For an example, see http://cfdintl.com or http://cantinearmament.com/. 
233 U.S. Navy, “Great Green Fleet,” U.S. Navy Energy, Environment and Climate Change, accessed 
October 23, 2017, http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/energy/great-green-fleet/. 
234 Mark S. Danigole, Biofuels: An Alternative to U.S. Air Force Petroleum Fuel Dependency 
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2007), 36. 
235 USSOCOM Deputy Program Executive Officer for Fixed Wing, “Fixed Wing” (presentation, 
Special Operations Forces Industry Conference, May 17, 2017). 
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wing platforms. It is beginning to transition into the conventional aviation realm, 
although the RCAF’s newest helicopter is not equipped with this capability.236 Ground 
refueling via a forward arming and refueling point remains the most likely tactical option 
for most aviation and may be the preferred option for both fixed- and rotary-wing mission 
profiles unsuitable for vulnerable tanker aircraft.  
In recognition of the continuing need to refuel, CANSOFCOM has developed the 
Airfield Surface Assessment and Reconnaissance (ASAR) capability to facilitate tactical 
airfield operations on unprepared, unconventional, and semi-prepared airfields.237 This 
capability allows CANSOFCOM to facilitate wet-wing refueling from CC-130 Hercules 
to helicopters, along with various other concepts to extend the range of tactical mobility 
platforms.238 Notwithstanding future fuel sources not yet operationalized, the need to 
refuel will exist well into the future. The goal of perpetual fuel is likely unreachable in 
the near-to-medium term. Capabilities such as ASAR increase the operational reach that 
the RCAF and CANSOFCOM can achieve together. 
I. SUMMARY 
This chapter analyzed eight trends that will have a significant impact on future 
Canadian SOF airpower. With these trends established, this study now turns toward 
specific implications for CANSOFCOM and the RCAF.  
  
                                                 
236 Royal Canadian Air Force, “CH-147F Chinook Technical Specifications,” accessed May 16, 2017, 
http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/aircraft-current/ch-147f.page. 
237 CANSOFCOM, “Special Forces Airfield Surface Assessment & Reconnaissance Program,” 
Briefing to War Cabinet, June 12, 2017.  
238 Jeannot Boucher, “Tactical-Aviation Mobility,” The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal 4, no. 4 
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VI. IMPLICATIONS 
You can have the best Special Mission Unit in the world, but if you can’t 
get ‘em there, it’s like a Mercedes you can’t get out of the garage. 
—Colonel (retired) Kenneth Poole, U.S. Air Force 
Veteran of Operation EAGLE CLAW239 
 
This study analyzed eight future trends applicable to 2040 and beyond for future 
SOF airpower. These trends demonstrate what the future may hold in the realms of both 
the probable and the possible. This study now turns to practicalities. What do these trends 
specifically mean for Canada? Based on the trends described in the previous chapter, 
Chapter VI evaluates ten implications for CANSOFCOM and the RCAF. 
A. THE ENDURING NEED FOR HUMAN INVOLVEMENT  
After all the GBUs have been dropped and the UAVs have landed, war 
remains a very human business. It cannot be done long-distance … it is 
done in the dirt, over chai, conversation and mutual understanding. 
U.S. Army Officer, Iraq War240 
 
Notwithstanding all the technological advances applicable to the conduct of war, 
the need for boots on the ground endures, meaning that lasting effects require direct 
human influence. Libya provides an excellent contemporaneous example. A 2018 study 
by the Jamestown Foundation concluded that airstrikes carried out against terrorists in 
Libya proved mostly ineffective: “rather than being scattered or deterred, many 
[terrorists] merely shifted their base of operations.”241 Airstrikes seem to have actually 
emboldened insurgent elements.242 The situation has worsened due to a lack of effective 
                                                 
239 Col (Ret.) Kenneth Poole, personal communication, November 16, 2017. 
240 As quoted in Singer, [Wired for War], 215. 
241 Allan Pilch and Avery Plaw, “Can Airstrikes Alone Tackle Islamic State in Libya?,” Terrorism 
Monitor, January 26, 2018, https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Terrorism-Monitor-
January-26-2018.pdf?x87069. 
242 Pilch and Plaw. 
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influence on the ground. In these examples and others, air operations and ground 
operations are mutually reinforcing. There is enduring synergy to be found between 
RCAF air assets and CANSOFCOM ground-based human sensors.  
Synergy between humans and technology is mutually advantageous for 
CANSOFCOM and the RCAF. Put simply, why would Canadian aircrew not want 
Canadian personnel on the ground to provide detailed targeting data? Likewise, a 
Canadian plane—particularly one optimized for observation and ground attack—is the 
preferred air support provider for Canadian ground operations. Those familiar with the 
targeting process know that a great deal of work goes into the precise, command-driven, 
and legally scrutinized process of target approval and engagement. The more that 
certainty is assured by, with, and through Canadians, the better. 
The unique perspective of one Canadian pilot makes this point abundantly clear. 
Captain Alan Lockerby fought as a ground-based Forward Air Controller in Afghanistan. 
As such, he was responsible to coordinate air strikes against enemy positions from 
forward positions and in close proximity to the enemy.243 He subsequently deployed to 
Libya in 2011 as a CP-140 Aurora pilot, doing a similar job but from the air. Lockerby 
explained that    
as a FAC in Kandahar, I knew exactly what my target was, who wanted it 
attacked, why it was to be engaged, and where friendly troops were 
positioned. Furthermore, with troops nearby, I could leverage friendly 
reporting.… [S]uch was not always the case in Libya, for myself or any 
other individual involved in this line of work. A person staring at an object 
or event on a screen from thousands of feet for hours on end will never 
have the same awareness as someone who spent just minutes looking at 
the same thing from ground level.244 
                                                 
243 Forward Air Controller (FAC) and Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) are used 
synonymously in this study. In both cases, they represent the individual on the ground who communicates 
with military aircraft to control movement, provide targeting data and deconflict movement with ground 
forces and other aircraft. 
244 Alan Lockerby, “SCAR-C over Libya – To War in an Aurora,” Canadian Military Journal 12, no. 
3 (Summer 2012): 65. 
 77 
Lockerby advocated for an increase of joint air-ground capability for his particular 
platform. His recommendation for interoperability applies across the range of RCAF 
aircraft for SOF operations. 
The enduring need for human involvement does not presuppose a large, highly 
visible military force on the ground. There are many tasks to be done on the ground: 
nomination of targets, battle damage assessment, collection of evidence and intelligence, 
persistent influence, mentorship of proxy forces, and support to other government 
departments, to name a few. These tasks are not necessarily limited to SOF, and the need 
for effective air-ground synergy applies to all ground forces. Perhaps shoes on the 
ground, not boots, is a more applicable idiom going forward. Future conflict does not 
necessitate solely uniformed military professionals to achieve these tasks, and a lower-
profile option provided by CANSOFCOM may be more appropriate. Likewise, the 
opportunity for inter-agency collaboration between diplomats, intelligence agents, and 
the military may also be highly appropriate.  
With these comments in mind, the SOF Truth that humans are more important 
than hardware remains highly relevant. All the technological advances aside, the 
decision-action cycle requires human authority. Certainly, SOF operations need human 
decision making in the near term while there is yet very low (or zero) trust from humans 
for autonomous machines. More broadly speaking, however, military and political 
decision makers must remain involved in order to provide accountability to the public 
they serve. Likewise, improvements in Canadian SOF airpower must be focused with the 
human dimension in mind since superior technology alone does not necessarily achieve 
intent. British Royal Marine Colonel David Heaver has observed that  
many missions can be safely accomplished by highly trained crews using 
conventional, unmodified aircraft.… [I]t was SOF aviators, flying 
conventional aircraft better than their non-SOF counterparts—more 
precisely, in harsher environments, mitigating the risks, and using 
conventional equipment in innovative ways—that proved it is the person, 
not the technology, that defines special operations.245 
                                                 
245 Colonel David Heaver, “Foreword,” Richard D. Newton, Special Operations Aviation in NATO: A 
Vector to the Future (Hurlburt Field, FL: JSOU Press, 2006), vii. 
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In any form, future conflict involving CANSOFCOM and the RCAF requires human 
influence to achieve long-term success. 
B. HUMAN-MACHINE TEAMING 
People and systems will become increasingly connected by technology 
that moves and analyses information faster, more accurately and with 
more automation. 
Future Operating Environment Handbook, 
CANSOFCOM246  
Intelligent machines will increasingly augment SOF missions as team members 
rather than tools. CANSOFCOM and RCAF personnel will remain in the loop across the 
spectrum of SOF mission sets but are likely to recede from it. As machines become 
increasingly autonomous, humans will correspondingly become more reliant upon them 
during tactical tasks, as depicted in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.  Human and Machine Autonomy during Tactical Tasks. 
Although the graph is highly simplified, the idea is complex. Human reliance on 
technology is occurring with faster acceleration and wider diffusion than previously 
expected. The military application of this was dubbed the Centaur Army: “the idea is not 
machines replacing humans. It’s not even about machines working autonomously 
                                                 
246 CANSOFCOM, Future Operating Environment Handbook, 9. 
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alongside humans. It’s about machines and humans being joined at the hip in a symbiotic 
relationship where each brings what it does best.”247 The combination of (intuitive, 
lateral-thinking, discerning, acute, and creative) military personnel teamed with smart 
machines is potent. 
An everyday example of the benefits of human-machine teaming is found in the 
game of chess. The chess world was upended in 1997 when the human grand master, 
Garry Kasparov, lost to a computer, which was a monumental event. Even more 
astonishing, however, was that in 2005, two amateur players, teamed with their personal 
computers, produced victories in a major chess tournament against grandmasters.248 
Kasparov describes this moment: “Their skill at manipulating and ‘coaching’ their 
computers to look very deeply into positions effectively counteracted the superior chess 
understanding of their grandmaster opponents.”249 Simple machines teamed with 
amateur humans yielded exceptional results. 
Chess and other games are, or course, bounded by rules while warfare on any 
scale is ambiguous and far more complex. War, then, requires even more human 
intuition. This human intellect is optimized when teamed with the processing power of a 
machine. According to the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, “only human 
judgment can wield military art, but such judgment is now best generated in hybrid 
solution approaches that join carefully selected, educated, and trained individuals with 
cognitive human performance enhancements.”250  
In a practical military application of human-machine teaming, consider the 
relationship between sensors and intelligence analysts. Chapter V discussed the overall 
challenge of big data and the requirement for automation. Currently, the ratio of sensors 
                                                 
247 A centaur is a mythical half-man, half horse. See Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Centaur Army: Bob 
Work, Robotics, & the Third Offset Strategy,” Breaking Defense, November 9, 2015, 
https://breakingdefense.com/2015/11/centaur-army-bob-work-robotics-the-third-offset-strategy/.   
248 Gary Kasparov, “The Chess Master and the Computer,” New York Review of Books, February 11, 
2010, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2010/02/11/the-chess-master-and-the-computer/. 
249 Kasparov. 
250 U.S. Army, The Operational Environment, 2035–2050: The Emerging Character of Warfare (Fort 
Eustis, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2017), 32. 
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to analyst is heavily weighted in one direction, at times requiring up to a crew of six 
personnel to operate and analyze one sensor platform.251 With developments in smart 
sensors and automation, this ratio will likely invert, and single individuals will monitor 
multiple sensors and harvest decision-quality information.252 Just like mission command 
has defined military leadership since the wars of the 20th century, the idea that human 
leaders will command intelligent machines is likely to begin to define leadership over the 
next few decades.253 SOF and Air Force leaders must integrate smart, autonomous 
machines into the fabric of organizational culture and leadership. 
C. JOINT BY DESIGN 
The SOF Truth that most special operations require non-SOF assistance will 
remain relevant far into the future, necessitating joint operations between SOF and the 
other elements of the CAF. CANSOFCOM is unlikely to grow air assets across the entire 
spectrum of tasks and capabilities. With a medium-size military and a budget below 
NATO guidelines, Canada cannot expect to replicate U.S. SOF assets.254 As such, 
CANSOFCOM and the RCAF must be fully interoperable and must increase the number 
of designated RCAF elements that support SOF missions. These relationships cannot fall 
prey to other nations’ ad hoc approaches that led to past mistakes, but rather need to be 
lasting and meaningful in order to foster common culture and shared understanding. The 
Royal Australian Air Force describes their perspective as joint-by-design, which 
                                                 
251 USSOCOM Deputy Program Executive Officer for Fixed Wing, personal communication, 
February 6, 2018. 
252 USSOCOM Deputy Program Executive Officer for Fixed Wing, personal communication, 
February 6, 2018. Also see Amado Cordova et al., Motion Imagery Processing and Exploitation (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND , 2013). 
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presumes a joint relationship is the start-state to any operational task.255 This 
presumption is optimal for Canada. 
The U.S. Marine Corps has a similar cultural perspective. Every Marine operation 
begins, other than in exceptional cases, with a joint air and ground task force. According 
to its doctrine, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF, pronounced “mag-taff”) is 
the “principal organization for the conduct of all missions across the range of military 
operations. MAGTFs are balanced, combined-arms forces with organic ground, aviation, 
and sustainment elements” (see Figure 7).256 
 
Figure 7.  MAGTF Doctrinal Organization.257 
MAGTFs are flexible, task-organized forces capable of global and rapid 
contingency response.258 While balanced, they are wholly focused and organized to 
support the Ground Combat Element. A Marine aircraft maintenance officer reflected, in 
an interview on February 22, 2018, that “every time a Marine maintainer works on a 
plane, or a Marine pilot steps into a cockpit, the primary focus is support to the Marine on 
                                                 
255 Australian Chief of Air Force, Air Force Strategy 2017–2027 (Canberra, Australia: Australian 
Defence Force, 2017), 16. 
256 MAGTFs scale from small special purpose MAGTFs up to almost 50,000 Marines. U.S. Marine 
Corps, Organization of Marine Corps Forces, MCRP 5–12D (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, 1998), 2–1. 
257 Adapted from U.S. Marine Corps, 2–2. 
258 U.S. Marine Corps, 2–1. It should be noted that the premier amphibious force, part of the U.S. 
Navy, has named its maneuver element the Air-Ground Task Force. 
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the ground. That’s it. That’s our ethos, that’s our culture.”259 CANSOFCOM operations 
would benefit from a similar start-state in both organization and ethos. An expanded 
apportionment of full-spectrum air assets to CANSOFCOM by default, removed only by 
exception, would respond to future trends in the air domain. 
D. MODULAR BY DESIGN 
The concept of modularity—operationally flexible by design—is highly relevant 
for future Canadian SOF airframes. Why not sense without the ability to strike? Why 
spend the time, fuel, and associated costs to transit a relatively expensive and scarce asset 
into an operational area without retaining the ability to achieve multiple effects on the 
ground? Chapter V introduced the concept of roll-on/roll-off modularity. The ability to 
rapidly reconfigure an air platform—fixed- or rotary-wing, piloted or otherwise—is 
gaining relevance and momentum in both industry and Western militaries. Numerous 
defense industry partners offer modular ISR and precision strike packages for many 
platforms.  
A roll-on/roll-off ISR and precision strike configuration for the CC-130 Hercules 
or the recently procured CC-295 is technically and technologically well-developed and 
may be viable for CANSOFCOM and the RCAF. The CC-295 fleet, in particular, is 
optimal in the Canadian context. It comprises 16 turbo-prop utility aircraft capable of 
short take-off and landing and is compatible with palletized sensor and weapon 
platforms.260 This plane was procured originally for the important task of domestic 
search and rescue. As a positive step to widen its operational role, the RCAF later 
changed the color of the CC-295 from canary yellow to tactical grey.261 Furthermore, 
                                                 
259 There is debate in the USMC SOF community that a SOF-specific helicopter capability is 
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two recent studies by RCAF officers advocated for combined ISR and precision strike 
packages for both the CP-130 Aurora and the CC-130 Hercules.262 All three of these 
RCAF platforms are suitably modular for ISR and precision strike roles. 
There are international examples of successful airframe modularity. Both the 
Jordanian and Italian militaries employ a light-variant gunship on an airframe similar to 
the CC-295.263 The U.S. Marine Corps integrated modularity into its KC-130 Hercules 
fleet, employing a “bolt-on/bolt-off ISR/weapon mission kit” known as Harvest HAWK, 
on ten airframes.264 Based on the success of this program, the Marine Corps plans to 
expand it to the entire fleet of Hercules aircraft and may apply the concept to their fleet 
of MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft.265 The ability for an airframe to quickly re-role from 
mobility into an ISR or strike platform, or perhaps even do these all at once, would be 
significantly advantageous for CANSOFCOM and the RCAF. 
To support modularity in a more general sense, hardware configurations should be 
standardized across the range of CANSOFCOM and RCAF platforms. USSOCOM has 
implemented this concept in the Airborne Mission Network program, in which 
standardized mounts and wiring in aircraft and vehicles allow installation of 
communication devices in a plug-and-play fashion.266 Concepts such as universal 
payload adaptors, common and nonproprietary interfaces, cross-domain data sharing, and 
open architecture all lead to more flexibility for the end user. Modular-by-design ideas 
such as these also minimize life-cycle costs, reduce the size of fleets, decrease integration 
timelines, simplify logistics, and promote rapid adaptation to changing or new 
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technology.267 The benefits of modularity are many, particularly for a medium-size 
military such as Canada.  
Retrofitting hardware onto a pre-existing airframe can pose difficult engineering 
problems.268 Broadening the skill sets of specialized aircrew can pose skills training and 
currency challenges. When considering a new asset, care must be taken not to hijack 
procurements, for adding more requirements late-to-need can draw out an already 
cumbersome defense procurement process. Finally, creating a jack-of-all-trades air 
platform may result in one that is good at many things but excellent at nothing.  
Notwithstanding the necessity for these prudent considerations, modularity makes 
eminent sense for CANSOFCOM and the RCAF. With the inclusion of future 
technology, one platform could provide, in alternate configurations at the same or 
different times, mobility, surveillance, and fire support. To entrench this concept, 
CANSOFCOM equities must be considered during major RCAF procurements and life 
extensions and vice-versa. 
E. ALTERNATIVE SERVICE DELIVERY 
Viable air support for CANSOFCOM operations can and should be sourced from 
non-traditional assets such as civilian contractors. In some cases, doing so will alleviate 
resource constraints for the RCAF. The Future Concepts Directive admits that “manned 
air surveillance of the domestic AOR vastly exceeds the capacity of the RCAF, both now 
and in the foreseeable future. The RCAF should investigate concepts and the implications 
and cost of outsourcing some of the low risk collection to commercial providers.”269 
CANSOFCOM currently employs contracted air support in a domestic context. This use 
of ASD should be expanded in the future to include tasks other than fixed-wing 
surveillance—for example, commercial satellite coverage—both domestically and 
abroad.  
                                                 
267 U.S. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, 32. 
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Non-standard platforms for fixed-wing precision strike should be explored. 
Alternative service delivery may provide a solution, although risk management may 
continue to be a thorny issue with the blending of military personnel and civilian 
contractors in an operational context. Perhaps, however, a non-standard platform does not 
always need to be operated by a contractor. The Afghan campaign has proved that leasing 
a civilian platform and employing it with CANSOFCOM aircrew is viable and should be 
considered.270 
Non-traditional sources of air support are viable for CANSOFCOM. RCAF 
support should always be considered the preferred supplier, but the scope of support 
sourced from commercial sources should be expanded in both a domestic and 
expeditionary context. 
F. FUEL SOURCES 
Perpetual fuel sources and unlimited flight duration will one day become 
commonplace, although not likely within Horizon 3. Therefore, CANSOFCOM and the 
RCAF must coordinate mutually reinforcing capabilities to extend the range of RCAF 
assets. Examples discussed previously, such as high-altitude pseudo satellites, clearly 
mark the trend of alternative energy sources. These burgeoning technologies provide 
numerous advantages, not least among them a significant reduction in the use of 
expensive and limited fossil fuels. Future fuel sources such as solar will not only reduce 
costs but will also positively affect the government of Canada’s goals to reduce its carbon 
footprint.271 The other significant benefit of future fuel sources is a reduction in the key 
factors of size, weight, and cooling so critical to determining aircraft payloads and range.  
The development of these energy sources is expected and likely; however, their 
trajectories are difficult to predict. In the short to near term, CANSOFCOM must 
continue to support tactical refueling of RCAF assets to extend operational reach beyond 
current capabilities. While air-to-air refueling is desirable, this capability is considered 
                                                 
270 Bernd Horn, “Creating Capability: Providing Integral Rotary Wing Support to CANSOF in 
Afghanistan” (unpublished Unclassified History of CANSOFCOM, November 14, 2017), 1.  
271 The Canadian Department of National Defence currently makes up more than 50 percent of the 
government’s carbon footprint. See Canadian Minister of National Defence, Strong Secure Engaged, 75. 
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both prohibitively scarce and prohibitively expensive.272 As such, the conduct of tactical 
refueling is expected to remain on the ground for all but high-end CANSOFCOM and 
RCAF assets. 
The CANSOFCOM ASAR capability extends tactical reach of CANSOFCOM 
and RCAF air assets in austere conditions. ASAR should be operationalized and 
broadened to include additional airframes beyond the CC-130 Hercules and should 
synchronize with the RCAF to achieve the expectation laid out in the 2017 Defence 
Policy Review that the RCAF can “operate from prepared or austere airfields anywhere 
in the world.”273 
With the expected development of perpetual fuel in the future, CANSOFCOM 
and the RCAF must remain engaged with technology industry partners and allied nations 
to observe and leverage advancements as they appear. 
G. PROCESSING, EXPLOITATION, AND DISSEMINATION 
The underlying problem is that there are simply not enough people 
available to analyse all the data being collected, even if personnel budgets 
were unconstrained. The problem is compounded as humans are inherently 
slow. 
Group Captain Peter Layton, 
Royal Australian Air Force.274 
Information is increasingly dominant and omnipresent, growing in volume, 
velocity and variety.275 Still, data quality trumps data quantity. CANSOFCOM and the 
RCAF must harness the power of smart, autonomous machines to avoid decision 
paralysis. As an indication of the increasing importance of information, the U.S. military 
recently added Information as a core warfighting function. According to a capstone joint 
publication, this addition will foster “deliberate integration with other joint functions to 
                                                 
272 Gathered from multiple AFSOC and USAF sources. For a NATO perspective, see 
https://www.japcc.org/double-counting-or-counting-double/. 
273 Canadian Minister of National Defence, Strong Secure Engaged, 39. 
274 Peter Layton, Algorithmic Warfare Applying Artificial Intelligence to Warfighting (Canberra, 
Australia: Air Power Development Centre, 2018), 21. 
275 These are the Three Vs of Big Data. See Layton, 21–23. 
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influence relevant actor perceptions, behavior, action or inaction, and support human and 
automated decision making.”276 Information dominance is key to successful 
CANSOFCOM and RCAF operations and is achieved through optimized PED. 
One method to achieve better PED is to front-load as much processing and 
exploitation of data as possible at the sensor. Smart sensors can improve PED by limiting 
the amount of raw data requiring dissemination and further exploitation. The U.S. 
program known as the Autonomous Real-Time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance Imaging 
System does just that. This system provides continuous full-motion video coverage of 
more than 100 square kilometers but only transmits high-definition elements to analysts 
on the ground on-demand.277 PED at the sensor is an area in which machine learning is 
making great strides as image and pattern recognition is becoming much more 
sophisticated. In addition to reducing the transmission of raw data, data compression at 
the sensor prior to transmission also significantly decreases the size of the downlink 
required between sensor and receiver. CANSOFCOM and the RCAF must harness these 
two significant growth areas. 
A second method to improve PED is to rear-load processing and exploitation that 
cannot be accomplished by smart sensors. Big data should be exploited and disseminated 
by personnel in Canada where fixed-point infrastructure and a larger and more diverse 
pool of personnel provides greater bandwidth, analytic tools, and redundancy.278 Rear-
loaded PED is not necessarily optimal in all cases, however. Forward deployed forces 
might be optimized for PED due to time-sensitivity, a degraded communications 
environment, or compartmented mission parameters. The correlation between location 
and amount of PED is simplified and depicted in Figure 8.  
                                                 
276 U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, JP-
1 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2017), I-17.  
277 William Matthews, “One Sensor to Do the Work of Many,” Defense News, March 1, 2010, 
http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/12E7AB74D0680320?p=AFNB. 
278 The concepts of data hygiene and master data are benefits of rear-loading PED. For the former, see 
Layton, Algorithmic Warfare, 12. For the latter, see David Loshin, “Defining Master Data,” BeyeNetwork, 
May 22, 2006, http://www.b-eye-network.com/view/2918.  
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Figure 8.  Optimized PED Location and Amount. 
In most cases, optimal PED is achieved either as far forward or as far rearward as 
possible. 
To further optimize PED, Canadian intelligence analysts must also employ new 
and novel methods of automated data analysis. There are a host of options in this domain, 
which a RAND study describes as being comprised of “automated tools that can analyze 
incoming motion imagery and cue human analysts to inspect segments that might depict 
prescribed objects or activities of interest.”279 There are also valuable lessons from pop 
culture. The same RAND study found relevant best practices in the production of both 
reality television programs and high-level sports events. More drastically, RAND 
recommended that the USAF should work to “give [Intelligence Analysts] the same 
capabilities at their workstations that many already enjoy with their personal DVRs at 
home.”280 Novel analytics solutions are widely available and should be explored and 
adapted for CANSOFCOM and RCAF use. Both organizations would benefit from 
inclusion in the U.S. Department of Defense’s Project Maven, designed to augment or 
                                                 
279 Lance Menthe et al., The Future of Air Force Motion Imagery Exploitation: Lessons from the 
Commercial World (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012), 45. 
280 Menthe et al., 24. 
 89 
automate the “enormous volume of data available to DoD [the Department of Defense] 
into actionable intelligence and insights at speed.”281 
These three methods of optimizing PED—use of smart sensors, front-end or back-
end loading of exploitation, and novel and automated analytics—will deliver information 
dominance to CANSOFCOM and the RCAF. 
H. INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE 
The demand for ISR in support of CANSOFCOM missions will continue to grow. 
The methods of providing that ISR, however, will diversify significantly. The majority of 
ISR will operate in the air domain although ground-based sensors and aggregation from 
cyber sources will continue to grow in relevance.282 As discussed in Chapter V, ISR will 
be increasingly autonomous and remotely piloted. The border between air and space will 
continue to fade, and the platforms operating therein will be increasingly capable, 
omnipresent, and unbounded by altitude, range, or payload. 
CANSOFCOM and the RCAF, along with the Canadian Armed Forces a whole, 
must employ a prudent number of ISR platforms of diverse types and capabilities. The 
2017 Canadian Defence Policy Review confirmed these requirements, vowing that the 
CAF will procure “next generation surveillance aircraft, remotely piloted systems … and 
space-based surveillance assets to significantly expand its Joint Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capacity.”283 Table 6 lists the range of available 
options for remotely piloted ISR platforms.  
                                                 
281 U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Establishment of an Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional 
Team (Project Maven) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2017), https://www.govexec.com/media/
gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/establishment_of_the_awcft_project_maven.pdf. 
282 Both the land and cyber domains deserve mention but are outside the primary scope of this study.  
283 Canadian Minister of National Defence, Strong Secure Engaged, 14. 
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Table 6.  RPA Classification Table.284 




(Less than 150 kg) 
 
Micro 
(Less than 2 kg) 












n/a 10,000 feet/200 km Sperwer 
Class III 
(more than 600 kg) 
Medium Altitude 45,000 feet/unlimited Heron, 
MQ-9 Reaper, 
Fire Scout 
High Altitude 65,000 feet/unlimited Global Hawk, 
Zephyr 
 
To achieve its stated aims, the government of Canada must consider employment 
of RPA ISR from all classes and classifications. Tactical elements must employ micro 
and mini variants for intimate support while higher-level SOF target development and 
operations will require robust and highly sophisticated sources.  
Remotely piloted aircraft will likely predominate future ISR. In most cases, 
piloting an ISR platform remotely, with a human on or in the loop, will be the preferred 
relationship between human and machine. This preference is certainly accurate for 
surveilling Canada’s borders and coastline, and other dull, dirty, or dangerous 
surveillance missions.285 Increasingly, the mission parameters possible without a human 
onboard will make RPA more capable. In other cases, remote piloting may be the only 
option, particularly with tactical level micro, mini, and small RPA. Swarms of mesh-
networked and disposable RPA will provide persistent coverage and support over wide 
                                                 
284 Adapted from Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Strategic Concept of Employment for 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems in NATO (Kalkar, Germany: Joint Air Power Competence Centre, 2010), 
http://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/UAS_CONEMP.pdf. The U.S. military employs a different 
classification system based on groupings instead of classes. 
285 Term coined by U.S. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unmanned Systems Integrated 
Roadmap FY 2013–2038, 20. 
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swaths of land or sea. With ongoing work in the area of downlink resilience, the 
difficulties of degraded communications environments are slowly receding.286 
USSOCOM intends for the majority of SOF ISR platforms to be remotely piloted by 
2023.287 RPA should also make up the preponderance of CANSOFCOM and RCAF ISR 
assets. 
CANSOFCOM still possesses, however, a requirement for Manned ISR 
(MAISR). Sensors and aircraft operated by discerning humans provide some advantages 
over RPA, in particular for mission sets that depend on real-time intelligence, a shortened 
response time between sensor and analyst, or analysis without a data-enabled 
communication downlink. MAISR may also be more useful since “environmental 
conditions, flexible equipment or configuration requirements, and political 
permissiveness, as restrictions, tend not to impact [MAISR] as severely as they do 
RPA.”288 MAISR may also be more reactive to split-second adjustments, emerging 
threats, or crisis response situations. A 2017 Australian study observed that “if we want 
to out-pace and out-manoeuvre a peer adversary in a very complex and highly dynamic 
environment, we need to resort to a high degree of dynamic (re)tasking.”289 This 
dynamic re-tasking capability may favor dynamic human involvement onboard. In the 
end, however, the optimal solution is not one or the other, but a complementary mixture 
of and cooperative action between both MAISR and RPA.  
Other, more novel ISR solutions will likely become prevalent with the progress of 
time. Space-based ISR is one solution. As of 2014, nine countries had space-launch 
                                                 
286 RPA must function without a guaranteed data connection if the communications link fails on its 
own or if it is negatively influenced by enemy action. Greater RPA autonomy helps. Retaining humans 
onboard does the same, although other risks then follow.  
287 USSOCOM Deputy Program Executive Officer for Fixed Wing, personal communication, 
February 6, 2018. 
288 Jared R. Harris and Peter R. McWilliam, “Valuing Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) for optimal employment” (Masters’ thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 101. 
289 Bart A. Hoeben, 5th Generation Air C2 and ISR: Exploring New Concepts for Air Command & 
Control and Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance Related to F-35 Employment in the RAAF and 
RNLAF (Canberra, Australia: Air Power Development Center, 2017), 17, http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/
APDC/media/PDF-Files/Fellowship%20Papers/FELL39-5th-Generation-C2-and-ISR.pdf. 
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capabilities and 1,167 satellites operated by 35 countries were in orbit.290 Space assets 
are less vulnerable to enemy action as they operate above our traditional concept of 
contested airspace, yet they do not provide a complete solution due to the tyranny of 
persistence described in Chapter V. Other solutions, such as high-altitude balloons, 
pseudo satellites, and loitering munitions, all broaden the array of ISR options that should 
be considered for future CANSOFCOM and RCAF procurement.291 As discussed earlier, 
the optimal solution for Canada is a robust, synergistic combination of many of these 
assets operating in a complementary fashion.  
As a final ISR consideration, CANSOFCOM must own a portion of the ISR 
continuum. Affiliation may work for other RCAF assets but will not work for high-
payoff, low-density intelligence collectors. NATO SOF HQ determined from a study that 
“reliance on non-dedicated air support … is equally disadvantageous due to scarcity of 
resources, lack of a habitual training relationship, and unfamiliarity with the SOF 
mission.”292 One 427 SOAS pilot wrote, in reference to SOF air support in general, that 
“the last, and least desirable, support relationship which may provide limited air effects to 
SOF is that of an ad hoc or non-dedicated nature. Only in executing the most basic tasks 
is this relationship helpful.”293 Without dedicated ISR, deployed SOF operations are only 
possible with the acceptance of greater risk. The government of Canada acknowledged 
this reality in the 2017 Defence Policy Review by pledging that an “airborne Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance platform will be acquired for the Special Operations 
Forces.”294 The CANSOFCOM requirement for broad ISR capabilities will continue to 
grow.  
A complementary mix of high-end SOF-specific platforms, dedicated and 
affiliated RCAF assets, and smaller, tactical, commercially available assets are necessary 
                                                 
290 Harry A. Foster, Dylan A. Bell, and Darren R. Turner, American Aerospace Power: Choosing to 
Lead in the Twenty-First Century (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2016), 15. 
291 Chapter V of this study discussed these concepts in more detail. 
292 NATO, Special Operations Air Group, 1. 
293 Streek, “Air Power Support to Special Operations,” 66.    
294 Canadian Minister of National Defence, Strong Secure Engaged, 65. 
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to meet ISR requirements out to the 2040s and beyond. Optimally, this mix involves the 
space and cyber domains, includes smart sensors, and incorporates assets that are 
modular and joint by design. 
I. SOF MOBILITY 
The insertion and extraction of SOF personnel will continue to be a core tactical 
task. Consequently, consideration of pragmatic and incremental growth in SOF rotary-
wing assets should occur. The 2017 Defence Policy Review should retroactively add a 
replacement for the CH-146 Griffon with SOF-specific considerations onboard.295 If 
optimized, this replacement would consider involvement in the U.S. Army’s Future 
Vertical Lift program due to the long-term benefits of tilt-rotor technology discussed in 
Chapter V. In the interim, CANSOFCOM and the RCAF must collaborate to meet 
current needs as part of the Griffon Limited-Life Extension. The U.S. Marine Corps UH-
1 Huey upgrade provides a viable and pragmatic example. Likewise, commercial off-the-
shelf options for modular weapon and sensor suites abound.296  
CANSOFCOM interoperability with the RCAF medium-lift helicopter capability 
should be continued and expanded. This relationship must support CANSOFCOM 
adequately to allow for episodic and sustained joint training while determining the best 
practices for integration of light and medium platforms under a domestic or expeditionary 
Special Operations Aviation Detachment. The Afghanistan campaign developed much of 
this force employment concept previously although without a SOF-specific nexus. 
For CANSOFCOM mobility needs beyond what helicopters can provide, 
CANSOFCOM interoperability with the CC-130 Hercules community must continue and 
expand for maintenance of the status quo is sub-optimal. In 2010, Bernard Brister wrote, 
relative to RCAF fixed-wing mobility, that “the heavy demands placed upon these 
aircraft, even for the day-to-day support of CF operations, makes them largely 
unavailable for special operations, barring an executive order that essentially would 
                                                 
295 Canadian Minister of National Defence, Strong Secure Engaged, 39. 
296 Discussed more fully in Chapter V. 
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cripple the CF air movement plan for weeks or months thereafter.”297 While the numbers 
and types of aircraft have changed since 2010, the need for interoperability remains 
constant. However, momentum behind CANSOFCOM in the tactical fixed-wing 
community is growing. The recent designation of SOF-specific aircrew for the CC-130J 
is an excellent step in the right direction.298 Interoperability, through greater exposure 
during both training and operations, will generate a stronger relationship and shared 
cultural understanding between CANSOFCOM and RCAF tactical fixed-wing transport.  
Future SOF mobility can be assured through SOF-specific precision rotary-wing, 
sustained training and operations with the RCAF heavy rotary-wing component, and 
expanded interoperability with the tactical fixed-wing community. 
J. PRECISION STRIKE 
The need for SOF-specific precision strike will likely extend far into the future. 
Then again, procuring a SOF-specific fixed-wing precision strike platform may remain 
fiscally and politically untenable for Canada. Nevertheless, a few implications regarding 
precision strike for CANSOFCOM still apply. First, CANSOFCOM must maintain the 
relationship between its Joint Terminal Attack Controllers and the RCAF fighter 
community. This relationship is based on over 12 years of operations and training and 
provides an excellent backbone for RCAF air support and precision strike during 
CANSOFCOM operations.  
Regardless of the direction that the CF-188 Hornet replacement project pursues, 
CANSOFCOM equities must be considered during the procurement process. It appears 
that this advanced fighter aircraft will be the sole attack aircraft in the RCAF.299 As such, 
it behooves both CANSOFCOM and the RCAF for it to be joint and modular to the 
benefit of both.  
                                                 
297 Brister, “Canadian Special Operations Mobility,” 52. 
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Notwithstanding the RCAF advanced fighter aircraft replacement, momentum 
appears to be gaining for a less technically advanced alternative to fifth-generation 
fighters. The USAF and AFSOC continue to invest resources into the OA-X program.300 
According to Jane’s Defence, these light, primarily turbo-prop aircraft are “powered by 
technology advances that make it possible to combine the ISR and strike capabilities once 
provided by multiple aircraft into a single, relatively simple and affordable platform.”301 
Although this may be an overly glowing description, OA-X does appear to provide a 
multi-role solution for tasks short of control of the air. With greater production levels of 
these light-strike platforms, Canada may be able to leverage lower per-unit costs if it 
elects to pursue this capability.302 Possessing a combination of both high-end fifth 
generation fighters and down-teched observation and attack aircraft such as OA-X would 
be the optimal mix. 
More pragmatic, perhaps, is the option for a roll-on/roll-off precision strike 
capability. CANSOFCOM and the RCAF should pursue the relatively inexpensive 
procurement of a modular weapon and sensor suite for both fixed- and rotary-wing 
platforms. Examples of both of these configurations abound.303 The greater challenge, 
when operationalizing modularity-by-design, will be the development of aircrew 
expertise and force employment concepts. Apart from the training delta, an expansion of 
the operational employment for current aircraft fleets achieves multiple complementary 
goals for both CANSOFCOM and the RCAF and should be pursued.  
                                                 
300 Posture Statement before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 115th Cong. (2018) 
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The future of precision strike in a Canadian context should involve a continuation 
of current relationships, consideration of CANSOFCOM equities in the CF-188 Hornet 
replacement, and either a modular roll-on/roll-off capability or a dedicated precision 
strike platform optimized for SOF. 
K. SUMMARY 
This chapter analyzed ten implications for CANSOFCOM and the RCAF in the 
development of future SOF airpower. These implications often link directly to the future 
trends discussed in Chapter V, but occasionally deviate and build on multiple trends or 
converging ideas. Several of these implications, for example Joint by design and PED, 
have direct benefit for the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Navy as well. Others, 
such as SOF mobility, may have less direct benefits. To the author’s knowledge, none of 
these implications contradict the stated priorities of the government of Canada or the 
Canadian Armed Forces and often bolster the aims set out in the 2017 Defence Policy 
Review. Importantly, none of these implications can be realized by CANSOFCOM alone, 
and as such, they require synchronization with the RCAF from the outset. In sum, 
fulfilling these implications will create a stronger CANSOFCOM and more interoperable 
RCAF, and a CAF focused on what the future holds for operations in the air domain. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
L’union fait la force has sought to determine which future air assets will be 
necessary to fulfill the government of Canada’s mandate for CANSOFCOM. This 
analysis focused on the optimization of SOF airpower in Canada. Even so, any benefit to 
CANSOFCOM airpower would mutually reinforce and benefit the RCAF, the Canadian 
Armed Forces as a whole, Canada, and perhaps even its allies. All of these entities can be 
stronger when CANSOFCOM and the RCAF operate jointly. 
A. SUMMARY OF TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This study began by discussing the history and future of SOF in Canada. It then 
answered why SOF will remain relevant in the future security environment, since future 
conflict will remain asymmetric and disorderly and will require joint, combined, and 
interagency solutions. Chapter III then compared Canada’s near-peer and likeminded 
SOF allies while Chapter IV described three failures caused by sub-optimal fixed- and 
rotary-wing assets. Chapter V then discussed eight trends shaping the composition of 











Table 7.  Summary of Future Trends. 
Future Trend Summary 
1 Remote Piloting 
A mixture of traditionally piloted and Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
(RPA) will achieve all future effects in the air domain. The use of 
these systems is certain, to the point where a better question is 





The world of artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy is 
burgeoning as it relates to airpower. Humans may not remain 
intimately connected to future platforms and will recede further 




Dissemination of Data 
The sheer depth and breadth of data requiring processing, 
exploitation, and dissemination (PED) is a daunting challenge for 
any military element now and into the future. CANSOFCOM 





These first three trends directly influence future ISR platforms. 
These platforms are increasingly capable, omnipresent, and 
unbounded by altitude, range or payload. 
5 Mobility 
Future mobility may trend in two separate directions, toward 
compound helicopters, personified in the SB-1 Defiant, or the tilt-
rotor class of aircraft platforms, most notably the V280 Valor. 
Regardless of the path, evidently the payload and range 
differences between helicopters and fixed-wing assets will 
continue to coalesce in the tactical realm. 
6 Precision Strike 
The future of fixed-wing strike platforms also has a rift between 
highly complex, expensive, and scarce fifth- and sixth- generation 
stealth fighters, and simple, down-teched observation-attack 
platforms such as the A-29 Super Tucano. Benefits and trade-offs 
exist between high-end and low-end assets, and an optimized air 




Resources employed in or supporting the air domain may 
increasingly use contractor owned and operated platforms 
involving civilian companies instead of traditional military units. 
Current examples, in Canada as well as abroad, show that air 
support from non-traditional sources is a viable option in the 
Canadian context. 
8 Fuel Sources 
Fuel sources will continue to develop and enable greater range and 
payload capacity across the spectrum of platforms in the air 
domain. However, the goal of perpetual fuel is likely unreachable 
in the near-to-medium term. 
 
With these trends established, Chapter VI turned toward ten specific implications 
for CANSOFCOM and the RCAF (see Table 8). 
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Need for Human 
Involvement 
Notwithstanding all the technological advances applicable to the conduct of 
war, the need for boots (or shoes) on the ground endures, since that lasting 
effects require direct human influence. Synergy between humans and 
technology is mutually advantageous for CANSOFCOM and the RCAF, and 




CANSOFCOM and RCAF personnel will remain in the loop across the 
spectrum of SOF mission sets but are likely to recede from it both literally and 
figuratively. Human intellect is optimized when teamed with the processing 
powering of a machine. SOF and Air Force leaders must integrate smart, 
autonomous machines into the fabric of operational culture. 
3 Joint by Design 
CANSOFCOM operations would benefit from a joint-by-design start-state in 
both organization and ethos. An expanded apportionment of full-spectrum air 
assets by default, removed only by exception, would increase the synergy 




Roll-on/roll-off ISR and precision strike packages would allow multi-role 
employment of RCAF assets without larger fleets. Modular design of 
hardware, in a broader context, makes eminent sense for CANSOFCOM and 




Viable air support for CANSOFCOM operations can and should be sourced 
from non-traditional assets. RCAF support should always be considered the 
preferred supplier, yet the scope of support sourced from commercial sources 
should be expanded in both a domestic and expeditionary context. 
6 Fuel Sources 
Perpetual fuel and unlimited flight duration will one day become 
commonplace. Until then, CANSOFCOM and the RCAF must coordinate 






CANSOFCOM and the RCAF must harness the power of smart, autonomous, 
analytical machines to avoid decision paralysis. Processing and exploitation 
should be done either at the sensor or back in Canada and should incorporate 





The demand for ISR in support of CANSOFCOM missions will continue to 
grow, yet the methods of providing that ISR will diversify significantly. 
Remotely piloted aircraft will predominate future ISR while CANSOFCOM 
still has a requirement for its own organic manned ISR. 
9 SOF Mobility 
Consideration of pragmatic and incremental growth in CANSOFCOM rotary-
wing assets should occur. Interoperability with the RCAF medium-lift 
helicopter and CC-130 Hercules capability should be continued and expanded. 
10 Precision Strike 
Procuring a SOF-specific fixed-wing precision strike platform may remain 
untenable for Canada, yet the need for SOF-specific precision strike will 
extend far into the future. Future precision strike should involve a continuation 
of current relationships, consideration of CANSOFCOM equities in the CF-
188 Hornet replacement, and either a modular roll-on/roll-off capability or a 
dedicated precision strike platform optimized for SOF. 
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Crucially, CANSOFCOM would struggle to address these implications alone and 
requires synchronization with the RCAF from the outset. The benefit in doing so is 
holistic for the CAF. Fulfilling these implications will create a stronger CANSOFCOM, a 
more interoperable RCAF, and a CAF focused on what the future holds for operations in 
the air domain. 
B. INTEROPERABILITY, NOT INTERDEPENDENCE 
Addressing the implications proposed in this study would make CANSOFCOM 
and the RCAF stronger together. Nevertheless, the absence of opposition to these ideas 
would be an anomaly. Unconventional military forces have traditionally faced resistance 
despite being implicitly complementary to their conventional counterparts. The U.S. 
military has battled over ownership of ISR assets for decades and saw similar contention 
during the reorganization of rotary-wing assets as a result of Operation EAGLE 
CLAW.304 In one description, some in the U.S. military viewed this reorganization as 
“an atrociously dumb idea.”305 
Opposition to augmented SOF airpower in Canada is expected but surmountable. 
It becomes particularly so because CANSOFCOM has no inherent interest in, and would 
never advocate for, a reduction in the capabilities of the RCAF or, for that matter, any 
other instrument of Canadian military power. CANSOFCOM must retain its ability to 
operate independently during SOF-specific missions and tasks. Pilot and professor 
Bernard Brister wrote that “a national SOF contribution must have the resources and 
capabilities to operate as a discrete force in the execution of its missions” while 
concurrently integrating attachment from the other military elements.306 A mature SOF 
element, which CANSOFCOM has become, must be equipped with enough capability to 
                                                 
304 Robert Gates, previous U.S. Secretary of Defence, described the inter-service fight over ISR as an 
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operate discretely. Retired U.S. Special Forces officer and professor Hy Rothstein wrote 
a similar opinion article in which he asked “why would any organization link its success 
to dependence on another organization, especially when lives are at stake? … The greater 
the interdependence, the greater the likelihood of conventionalizing a [special operation] 
and losing sight of the mission’s original purpose.”307 Both CANSOFCOM and the 
RCAF must remain highly skilled at their own specialized and niche areas yet must 
equally join together in matters of national interest when appropriate. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This study strove to encompass background and analysis sufficient to spur 
change. Even so, further study is necessary. The exact composition of an expanded 
CANSOFCOM air component remains outside the scope of this study. This absence is 
mostly due to scale since the analysis for a composite special operations aviation 
squadron would likely necessitate a study proportionate to this one. Equally importantly, 
the exact composition and command and control arrangement will morph as elements are 
added and subtracted iteratively, over time. Further study, incorporating concepts from 
the field of Organizational Design, could address the exact composition of a 
CANSOFCOM air component.308 
As a start point, however, this study offers several broad option areas to begin this 
design. First, growing a SOF-specific air wing for Canada is likely far too elaborate and 
unnecessary. Light, agile, and interoperable are characteristics that are far more 
appropriate, and a composite Special Operations Aviation Squadron based around 427 
SOAS is an appropriate framework. To determine precise requirements, a joint RCAF-
CANSOFCOM-Canadian Army symposium should be planned to discuss common issues 
                                                 
307 Hy Rothstein, “Conspicuous and Persistent Absurdity,” Special Warfare 29, no. 1 (2016): 86. 
308 The field of Organizational Design includes significant literature on how to best configure 
organizations. One seminal work contrasts the stability or volatility of the operational environment with the 
number and diversity of external factors impacting the unit, and argues that organic structures and de-
centralized control become increasingly important as uncertainty grows. See Henry Mintzberg, Structure in 
Fives (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993).   
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facing air support to ground forces.309 Last, the addition of a RCAF Air Component 
Commander in CANSOFCOM HQ, with a reciprocal SOF air advisor in 1 Canadian Air 
Division, would give additional coherence and organization to the employment of SOF 
air power.310 
D. FINAL THOUGHTS 
CANSOFCOM is a key component of the Canadian Armed Forces with 
deepening operational relevance, yet it lacks optimal airpower. This study sought to 
determine which future airpower trends Canada must consider in order to optimize SOF 
airpower out to 2040 and beyond. Although this analysis may not provide an 
unobstructed roadmap into the future, it fills a gap in previous literature and should serve 
as a starting point or reinvigorate further discussion. Notwithstanding the complexity of 
the future, the links between CANSOFCOM and the RCAF must grow in order for those 
organizations to remain relevant. They are both stronger together. 
                                                 
309 This idea was initially developed by the CANSOFCOM Commander’s Advisory Group. 
CANSOFCOM Officer, name withheld, email message to author, May 30, 2018. 
310 For the role of an ACC, see Commander 2 Canadian Air Division, Canadian Forces Aerospace 
Command Doctrine, B-GA-401-000 (Winnipeg, MB, Canada: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, 
2001), 19. 
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